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Europe 1992 and the Rise of the Pacific
Rim: Do Changing World Trading
Patterns Require a Change in United
States Shipping Laws?
Andrew M. Danas*
ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes the significant issues facing the PresidentialAdvisory Commission on Ocean Conferences in Ocean Shipping. This Commission will assess the success of the Shipping Act of 1984 and will report to Congress on the need for changes in the 1984 Act and in United
States regulatory policy regardinginternationalocean common carriers.
Mr. Danas recommends that the Commission carefully examine the antitrust-exempt conferences, which international ocean common carriers
have been organizingfor over one hundred yearsfor the purpose of selfregulation and rationalization.Mr. Danas suggests that the review of
the continued existence of the liner conference system requires a recognition that the ocean transportationindustry is changing into an international intermodal transportationindustry that handles shipments in one
continuous movement from origin to destination. The author emphasizes
that the development of a post-1992 European Common Market and the
adoption of Pacific Rim distributiontechniques will further the trend towards integrated transportationcompanies and the use of full service
logistics in internationalshipping. He suggests that the development of
* Associate, Grove, Jaskiewicz, Gilliam & Cobert. J.D., 1982, George Washington
University; B.A., 1977, University of Connecticut. The opinions expressed in this Article
are solely those of the author.
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the international intermodal transporation company and the needs of
shippers dealing with such companies must figure prominently in the Advisory Commission's treatment of those issues that Congress has required
it to addess-tarifffiling,antitrustimmunity for ports, independent action on service contracts, and the existence of the conference system. Mr.
Danas suggests a framework whereby the Commission may successfully
integrate these issues into the task presently committed to it by Congress.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Changing trade relations and technology are forcing changes in the
United States economy and many of its laws governing international
commerce. Economic regulation of international ocean shipping represents the cutting edge of the inherent conflict in policies that must coordinate domestic and international concerns. Domestically, for example,
the United States has maintained a strong policy against antitrust exemptions.1 Internationally, however, the United States has allowed ocean
carriers to join and form antitrust-exempt conferences for the purposes of
economic self-regulation and the reduction of competition.2 Accommodating the interests of its trading partners has been a major concern of the
United States in justifying the different regulation of international ocean
shipping.' National defense issues, in the form of promoting a strong
merchant marine, have also been at the forefront of United States shipping policy.'
Antitrust exemptions in the ocean shipping industry have existed since
1916. In 1984 Congress revised the international shipping laws conferring these exemptions.' The Shipping Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act) was
compromise legislation, the result of six years of congressional efforts to
revise the regulation of international shipping to accommodate changing
technology and concepts of international law.' The 1984 Act was an un-

1. "Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963) (quoting California v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)).
2. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1720 (Supp. V 1987)).
3. The Shipping Act of 1984, for example, declares that one of its purposes is "to
provide an efficient and economic transportation system in the ocean commerce of the
United States that is, insofar as possible, in harmony with, and responsive to, international shipping practices." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1701(2).
4. The third enumerated purpose of the 1984 Act is "to encourage the development
of an economically sound and efficient United States flag liner fleet capable of meeting
national security needs." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1701(3).
5. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 1, 39 Stat. 728 (current version at 46 U.S.C.
app. §§ 801-842 (Supp. V. 1987)). See generally FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
[F.M.C.], SECTION 18 REPORT ON THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1984 at 33-39 (Sept. 1989)
[hereinafter SECTION 18 REPORT]; Fawcett & Nolan, United States Ocean Shipping:
The History, Development, and Decline of the Conference Antitrust Exemption, 1 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 537 (1979); Buderi, U.S. Policy on Regulation of Liner Shipping in
the 1980s: A View From Washington (pts. 1 & 2), 17 J. MAR. L. & Com. 493 (1986),
18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 111 (1987).
6. Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1720.
7. Initial attempts to revise United States shipping laws were introduced in Congress
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easy political compromise between carriers and shippers: carriers would
receive a strengthened exemption under the. antitrust laws while shippers
would gain new rate reduction tools.8
A key provision of the 1984 Act reflects the congressional uneasiness
over the compromise; it provides for review of the 1984 Act by a Presidential Advisory Commission on Ocean Conferences in Ocean Shipping
(Presidential Advisory Commission or Advisory Commission).9 To be established five and one-half years after the statute's enactment, the Advisory Commission will study the success of the Shipping Act of 1984 and
address the central issue underlying United States economic regulation of
ocean common carriage: continued existence of the liner conference system.10 The Advisory Commission will file with Congress its report recommending possible changes to the Shipping Act of 1984 and United
States regulatory policy on international ocean common carriage.1 1
Congress has mandated that the Advisory Commission revisit the key
issues of the 1984 Act's debates: tariff filing; antitrust immunity for
ports; independent action on service contracts; and the existence of the
conference system. 2 Over the past five years, rapid technological and
economic changes have altered the focus of the Advisory Commission's

in 1978. The following bills were introduced in the 96th through 98th Congress:
Senate Bills:
S. 1460, 1462, 1463, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 17,551, 17,601-09
(1979);
S. 2585, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 9000, 9002-10 (1980);
S. 125, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
S. 1593, 97th Cong., 1st. Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 19,352, 19,354-68 (1981);
S. 47, 504, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REc. 51,828 (daily ed. Mar.
1, 1983). S. 47 is also reprinted in Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Merchant
Marine of the Senate Comm. on Com., Science, and Transp. on S. 47, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
House Bills:
H.R. 11,422, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 6331-32 (1978);
H.R. 4769, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 18,392 (1979);
H.R. 6899, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
H.R. 4374, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 19,565 (1981);
H.R. 1878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. (1983).
8. H.R. REP. No. 600, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1984) [hereinafter CONF. REP.];
130 CONG. REC. H1292 (daily ed. March 6, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi) [hereinafter
Remarks of Biaggi].
9. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717.
10. CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 43. See infra text accompanying notes 158-63,
187-91.
11. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(h),
12. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717; CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 43.
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mandate. The 1984 Act's legalization of through intermodal transportation and of the use of service contracts in ocean transportation has significantly altered how international freight moves.1 3 These changes in the
law may have provided an important impetus to a restructuring of the
domestic transportation market in recent years. In addition, the transformation of world trading patterns, including the rise of the Pacific Rim
and the forging of a borderless European Common Market of 320 million consumers by the end of 1992, has created new pressures on the
transportation industry, and Congress, to examine transportation flows
and the laws governing international shipping.
In advisory hearings held at the Federal Maritime Commission
(F.M.C.) in April 1989, major shipper interests proposed that the antitrust exemptions in ocean shipping be eliminated and that the industry
be deregulated in a manner similar to that experienced by the domestic
transportation industry in the 1980s, with a contract system for large
shippers and a tariff system for small and medium-sized shippers., 4
Thus, the Advisory Commission must focus on two key questions: first,
the extent to which changes in United States trading patterns and corresponding changes in the structure and services provided by transportation companies have altered the need for a conference system in the 21st
century; second, whether the Shipping Act of 1984 is ensuring the viability of the conference system. The Advisory Commission must look beyond the discrete issues that Congress identified in the early 19 80s as
important in order to determine what legal structures the international
transportation industry will need for the next century. The Advisory
Commission must also provide a blueprint for how transportation services will become part of a world trading system in the 1990s.
This Article is a survey of the key issues that the Presidential Advisory Commission has a mandate to study. Because the proposal of the
major shippers to abolish the conference system is likely to be a key focus
of the political debate on the Shipping Act, the Article also identifies and
discusses those issues that the Advisory Commission should examine in
considering the effect of that proposal on small and medium-sized
shippers.

13. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1707(a), 1709(c)(2). See infra part III, section A.
14. Position of the Shipper Study Group and Advisory Committee on Amendments
to the Shipping Act of 1984 (Mar. 24, 1989) [hereinafter Shipper Position Paper], reprinted in 3 F.M.C., SECTION 18 STUDY ADVISORY COMMITTEE: MEETING OF APRIL
6, 1989, at 3, 11-14 [hereinafter SECTION 18 PROCEEDINGS].

1040
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II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME AND THE NEED FOR
REVIEW
A.

The Historical Perspective

In the late 1970s, the United States sought to loosen the regulatory
reins on the transportation industry. Railroads, motor carriers, and airlines were substantially deregulated.1 5
Changes in economic thought as to the technological and competitive
structure of the transportation industries as they existed in the United
States resulted in major changes in government oversight of these industries. In the first half of the 20th century, the United States actively
regulated the transportation industries under a public utility theory of
regulation. 6 While private enterprise could retain control over transportation services (unlike in many other countries), the Government would
have its say over market entry and rates in the transportation industry.1
Collective ratemaking and the rationalization of services have also
been a hallmark of many modes of transportation, including ocean ship15. The trend started with the railroad bankruptcies of the early 1970s, the most
notable being the Penn Central bankruptcy that led to the creation of Conrail. In 1976
Congress sought to loosen railroad regulatory restrictions by passing the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31. Implementation of that act, however, was less speedy than Congress desired. In 1980, Congress
enacted the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895.
The airline industry was substantively deregulated in 1977 and 1978. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705. The air passenger market was
deregulated in 1980. International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L.
96-192, 94 Stat. 48 (1980).
The motor carrier industry was partially deregulated in 1980. Motor Carrier Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793. This deregulation consisted of a reduction of
regulatory market entry barriers and provision of a right to enter into domestic contractual agreements.
16.

Cf L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 744 (1977).

17. In many countries the perception of transportation as a public utility has led to
state ownership and operation. Because state-owned carriers are often heavily subsidized,
they can have an adverse effect upon the competitive posture of nonsubsidized private
carriers. The Shipping Act of 1984 gives the Federal Maritime Commission authority to
review the rate levels of such foreign "controlled carriers" operating in the United States
trades. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1702(8), 1708. Section 19(1)(b) of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1920 gives the F.M.C. authority to address restrictive shipping conditions in foreign
trades resulting from the actions of foreign laws or vessel operators. 46 U.S.C. app. §
876(1)(b). The Foreign Shipping Practices Act of 1988 gives the F.M.C. additional authority to review the laws of foreign countries that may assist foreign flag carriers or
impede the operations of United States flag carriers. Act of Aug. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, tit. X, §§ 1001-1003, 102 Stat. 1570 (codified at 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 1710(a)
(West Supp. 1989)).
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ping.' The argument is that economies of scale and cutthroat competition require competitor cooperation for the transportation industry to be
profitable. High fixed capital costs and the derived demand nature of the
industry have also been cited as reasons for group rate efforts.' 9
A crucial premise of the deregulation movements of the 1970s was the
concept that pressures from competing modes of transportation could
substitute for regulation and the cooperative efforts of each individual
mode of transportation.2" Historically, each mode of transportation has
generally been regulated economically as a discrete entity. For example,
regulation of the motor carrier industry primarily focused on competitive
conditions in that market, rather than on developing a uniform set of
regulations and federal policies encompassing the relationship between
motor carriers and their competitors in the rail industry.2 ' This separate
regulation reflected, in part, market and technological distinctions between each mode of transportation. In a breakbulk era of shipping, the
continuous transfer of manufactured goods from one mode to another as
part of a single movement in a commercially acceptable period of time
was not a common practice.22

18.

Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1720 (Supp. V 1987). In the_

domestic surface transportation industries, rail and motor carriers were allowed to crote
rate bureaus. 49 U.S.C. § 10,706(a) (1982).
19. Ocean Common Carrier Position Paper on the Shipping Act of 1984, March 20,
1989, [hereinafter Carrier Position Paper], reprinted in SECTION 18 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 14, at 105-06. See also SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 23-25.
20. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10,505(0 (1982); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Interstate
Com. Comm'n, 656 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1981) (I.C.C. "was not arbitrary and
capricious in finding and relying upon intermodal competition as a basis for its finding
that regulation of TOFC/COFC service was not required to prevent abuses of market
power by railroads").
21. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) was initially created
to regulate the railroad industry. Congress regulated the shipping industry next. Initial
calls to have the industry regulated by the I.C.C. were rejected in favor of regulation by
a separate agency. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 33-34. Although the motor
carrier industry was placed under the regulatory jurisdiction of the I.C.c. pursuant to
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stht. 543, the airline industry was regulated
by the Civil Aeronautics Board until 1985. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52
Stat. 973.
22. Prior to containerization, the transshipment of breakbulk goods was a time-consuming process. Up to three days could be spent loading and unloading a ship. Containerships, in contrast, can spend as little as eight hours in port. See generally CoMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/PAD-82-11, CHANGES IN
FEDERAL MARITIME REGULATION 12 (1982) [hereinafter GAO Report]; SECTION 18
REPORT, supra note 5, at 46-47; Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the

Container Revolutions, 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 203 (1970); Tombari, Trends in
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By the 1970s this situation had changed. Technological changes in
how goods were shipped-"containerization"-made the interchangeable
use of transportation modes increasingly prevalent.2 3 The domestic trans-

portation industry was thus ripe for a regulatory change. By 1980 legislation had been enacted that reduced government regulation of motor,
rail, and air carriers.24 The purpose of this deregulation was to foster
substantial inter- and intramodal competition.25
United States regulation of international ocean transportation also
found itself subject to pressures for regulatory changes in the late 1970s.
The thrust of this deregulatory pressure, however, was almost exactly
the opposite of that occurring in the domestic transportation market.
Rather than the exchange of increased competition for a reduction in
federal regulation-the basic tradeoff in the domestic industries-ocean
shipping interests sought a stronger exemption from the antitrust laws to
allow their collective activities, with less government regulation at the
26
same time.
The international nature of the ocean shipping industry explains this
policy difference. As with other transportation modes, ocean transportation had until the 1970s been considered a separate industry for regulatory purposes. 27 The breakbulk aspect of the industry-indeed, the water
mode of transportation-led to regulation of the maritime industry as

Oceanborne Containerizationand Its Implicationsfor the U.S. Liner Industry, 10 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 311 (1979); Agman, Competition, Rationalization, and the United
States Shipping Policy, 8 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1 (1976).
23. See supra note 22.
24. See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895; Motor Carrier
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793; Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
25. For example, the Staggers Act of 1980 established a specific rail transportation
policy of the United States Government, which, in part, was "to ensure the development
and continuation of a sound rail transportation system with effective competition among
rail carriers and with other modes, to meet the needs of the public and the national
defense." 49 U.S.C. § 10,101a(4) (1982).
26, SENATE COMM. ON COM., SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., THE SHIPPING ACT OF
1983, S. REP. No. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-11 (1983); SECTION 18 REPORT, supra
note 5, at 3.
27. In 1914 a congressional study and report on the liner conference system recommended that the I.C.C. regulate the liner conference system. This recommendation, by
the Alexander Commission, was rejected in favor of regulation by a separate agency. See
REPORT OF

HOUSE

COMM. ON THE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, ON STEAM-

SHIP AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS

IN THE AMERICAN

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 419-420 (1914) [hereinafter Alexander Report]; H.R. REP. No. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-32 (1916).
TRADE,
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beginning and ending at the water's edge. 2"
Characterized by high fixed costs, relative ease of market entry, and
cutthroat competition, in the 1870s steamship operators devised a selfregulatory system of cartels known as conferences to reduce some selfdestructive tendencies of the industry. 29 The liner conference system,
present in many of the major world trades, had counterparts in other
transportation industries-in particular, the domestic rail and motor carrier industries.30 However, whereas the ability of such domestic carriers
to enter cartel arrangements was merely a limited aspect of a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing market entry and pricing mechanisms, the primary purpose of United States policy regarding the liner
conference system has been to regulate the creation and operation of
these cartels."
The conference system has been allowed to exist in the United States
trades in part because United States trading partners have sanctioned
and fostered development of the conference system, despite arguments
that the economics of the ocean shipping industry are no different from
domestic transportation modes and that the industry thus does not need,
nor merit, a strong exemption from the antitrust laws.32
In 1916 Congress accepted the recommendations of the Alexander
Commission to allow the conference system. 3 Congress rejected on the
grounds of international comity proposals for a strict regulation of the
system similar to that of the domestic rail industry under the Interstate
Commerce Act.3 Instead, it allowed the liner conference system to operate in the United States trades, subject only to prior agency review and
approval of the effects of the agreements on competition.3" In 1961 the

28. Cf. Friedmann and Devierno, The Shipping Act of 1984: The Shift From Government Regulation to Shipper "Regulation," 15 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 311, 318-19
(1984).
29. Agman, supra note 22, at 1; Bennathan & Walters, Shipping Conferences: An
Economic Analysis, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 93 (1972); Llorca, Antitrust Exemption of
Shipping Conferences, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 287, 287-91 (1975).
30. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10,706 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
31. See Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 28, at 316.
32. See Alexander Report, supra note 27; Letter from Brooks Hays, Asst. Sec. of
State to Senator Engle (Aug. 15, 1961), reprinted in INDEX TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE/DUAL RATE LAW, S. Doc. No. 100, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 228-29 (1962); GAO Report, supra note 22, at 33; S.REP. No. 3, supra note 26,
at 7.
33. See SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 25-27, 33-36.
34. Cf SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 33-34.
35. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (current version at 46 U.S.C. app. §§
801-842 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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United States adopted a system of tariff filing. 6 This allowed agency
37
policing of unreasonable rates and discriminatory practices.
As with the domestic transportation industries, by the late 1970s technological and economic changes had created pressures for regulatory reform in the ocean shipping industry. The increasing containerization of
the trades was transforming the conduct of ocean transportation. 8 In
addition, the increasingly international activity of United States multinational corporations led the Department of Justice to assert a more activist international role. In the OPEC era of the 1970s, anything that
looked and smelled like a cartel was subject to Justice Department scrutiny.39 For the steamship industry, the result was a grand jury investigation that brought an indictment for price fixing and imposition of a restraint of trade on five corporations, two groups of shipping firms, and
thirteen individuals. A plea of nolo contendere and a $5.4 million fine
resolved the criminal proceeding. A subsequent class action was settled.4
The Shipping Act of 1984 had its genesis in the 1970s lawsuit. Carriers perceived a need for a stronger antitrust exemption-one that clarified their freedom to act collectively and avoided the regulatory burdens
and lengthy court battles accompanying the existing system of regulation.4 In addition, carriers wanted the right to offer through intermodal

36. Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, 75 Stat. 762, 764-66 (codified at 46
U.S.C. § 817 (1982) (amended 1984)). For an overview of the legislative history of tariff
filing in the international liner industry, see SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 491508.

37.

See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 815, 816 (1982) (amended 1984).

38. GAO Report, supra note 22, at 12; Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 22;
Tombari, supra note 22; Agman, supra note 22, at 45-47.
39. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 26, at 7-8. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.) argued that the conference system antitrust exemption
encouraged inefficiency by restricting market entry, limiting innovations, and requiring
efficient conference members to price their services at the level of their least efficient

members. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm, on theJudiciary,on H.R. 1878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) [hereinafter HouseJudiciaryHearings]. Some carriers hold similar views. See, e.g., Hearings

before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, on H.R. 4374, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1982) [hereinafter Regulatory
Reform Hearings] (statement of John R. Arwood, President Trans-Freight Lines, Inc.).
40. United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Crim. No. 79-00271 (D.D.C. filed
1979). A copy of the grand jury indictment is reprinted in Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, on S. 47 and S. 504, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 70-87 (1983)
[hereinafter SenateJudiciaryHearings] (attachment to testimony of Thomas E. O'Neill,
National Association of Beverage Importers). See also In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust
Litig., 500 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
41. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 26, at 6-11; 129 CONG. REc. S1487 (daily ed. Feb.
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services to their customers, a right the Justice Department legally disputed on the grounds of conflicting agency jurisdiction between the Justice Department and the Federal Maritime Commission (F.M.C.) over
such rates.

42

Thus, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the carrier industry initiated
a lobbying effort to revise the 1916 Shipping ActO3 The industry had
three goals: the streamlining of the agreement approval process; a
strengthening of the industry's antitrust immunity; and a right to offer
through intermodal rates.4" As a result of compromises with major shippers, carriers obtained only two of these goals: a through intermodal system and a streamlined antitrust approval process.4 5 Whether their efforts
achieved the other goal, a strengthened conference system, is subject to
debate because shipper compromises included in the 1984 Act introduced
concepts of contract carriage and independent action into the conference
system.46
The focus of debate during the six years leading to passage of the
Shipping Act of 1984 was the concept of open versus closed conferences.
Simply stated, an open conference is one that must admit all trade participants as members.47 A closed conference is one that may restrict and
limit its membership.48 An analysis of this debate requires a brief review

22, 1983) (statement of Sen. Gorton);
TRANSP., THE SHIPPING

AcT

OF

SENATE

COMM. ON

COM., SCIENCE,

AND

1982, S.REP. No. 414, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7-8

(1982).
42. See United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
See also Pennsylvania v. I.C.C., 561 F. 2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ex Parte No. 261,
Tariffs Containing Joint Rates and Through Routes for the Transportation of Property
Between Points in the United States and Points in Foreign Countries, 337 I.C.C. 625
(1970); 341 I.C.C. 246 (1972), 346 I.C.C. 688 (1974); 350 I.C.C. 361 (1975), 351
I.C.C. 490 (1976), 355 I.C.C. 913 (1977); United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
655 F.2d 247 (D.C Cir. 1980). See generally O'Neill, JurisdictionalConflicts Between
the Federal Maritime Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commissions, 6 MAR.
LAW. 51 (1981).

43. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 28, at 319.
44. Id. at 316-19.
45. See infra part II, section B(1); text accompanying note 176-85.
46. See infra part III, section B(3), B(3)(a).
47. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 24. The Shipping Act of 1984 requires all
conference agreements to provide for "reasonable and equal terms and conditions for
admission and readmission ... for any ocean common carrier willing to serve the particular trade or route" and to "permit any member to withdraw from conference membership upon reasonable notice without penalty." Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §

1704(b)(2)-(3).
48. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 24. See also Hanson, Regulation of the
Shipping Industry: An Economic Analysis of the Need for Reforms, 12 J. L. & PoL'Y
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of Third World political events affecting ocean shipping in the early
1980s.
In 1983 enough signatory nations ratified the United Nations Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences (the UNCTAD Code) for it to be implemented.4 The UNCTAD Code is a maritime promotional statute
formed under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). The purpose of the UNCTAD Code is to
assist developing countries in forming a shipping industry. The
UNCTAD Code preserves forty percent of a given trade between two
nations for the flag ships of each trading partner. It preserves the remaining twenty percent of the trade for independent third flag carriers. °
The purpose behind this 40-40-20 cargo reservation scheme is to preserve a trade for a given state and its trading partner while also recognizing the comity issues inherent in allowing some semblance of free
trade.5 In addition, the twenty percent market share reserved for third
flag carriers is perceived as an interjection of competition into the
trades.2 Rates can be kept in check in a dosed trade if independent
carriers can enter the trade."
While the United States and its major trading partners initially opposed the UNCTAD Code, the idea that shipowners should have greater
ability to control, coordinate, and rationalize their services gave strong
impetus for proposals to authorize closed conferences in the early 1980s.
In other words, if the shipping industry were to achieve true rationaliza-

INT'L

Bus. 973 (1980).

49. UNCTAD, United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiarieson a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, Final Act and Annexes, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/1l/Rev. 1
(May 9, 1974), reprintedin 13 I.L.M. 910 (1974). See also Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 954/79 of May 15, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 121) 1-4 (1979); Buderi,
supra note 5, pt. 1, at 502-05; id. pt. 2, at 114-16; SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5,
at 28-29.

50.

UNCTAD,

THE REGULATION OF LINER CONFERENCES

FOR THE LINER CONFERENCE SYSTEM)

(A

CODE OF CONDUCT

at 23, U.N. Doc. TD/104/Rev.1, U.N. Sales

No. E.72.II.D.13 (1972).
51. See Kanuk, The UNCTAD Code of Conductfor Liner Conferences: Trade Milestone or Millstone-Time Will Soon Tell, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 357, 358 n.2
(1984); Buderi, supra note 5.
52. UNCTAD, PROTECTION OF SHIPPER INTERESTS, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/174
(1978) [hereinafter UNCTAD, SHIPPER INTERESTS].
53. See, e.g., Ellsworth, Competition or Rationalization in the Liner Industry? 10
J. MAR. L. & COM. 497, 515-17 (1979); Comment, The Sinking Shipping Industry, 5
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 99, 102 (1983).
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tion and profitability, its members all had to march to the same
drumbeat.54
The arguments given for closed conferences included comity with trading partners and preservation of flag carriers. Since United States trading partners in many cases allowed dosed conferences, the United States
should also do so, if not as a matter of economics, then as a matter of
political and diplomatic comity. Some made an economic argument that
while a strong closed conference system could indeed result in less competition, it would enable carriers to obtain conference cohesion and stability, thus preserving its members' financial stability, including that of
United States flag carriers.55 If the United States wanted to maintain a
strong merchant marine for national defense purposes or otherwise, a
strong conference system would do so best.56
While many aspects of the Reagan Administration's antitrust legacy
have been criticized as too lenient in allowing market concentration, the
Reagan Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission consistently
opposed any form of price fixing.5" It is thus interesting that the Administration did not voice a strong opposition to the conference system, but
instead assisted in the efforts to reform it. The Administration did object,
however, to the Government's assisting a price fixing cartel in policing
its members. It also favored the presence of independent carriers in the
trades.

58

Leading the debate against the demands for a stronger conference system were shipper interests that sought concessions from carriers in exchange for a strengthened antitrust immunity. The end result was com-

54. See, e.g., Kanuk, supra note 51, at 369-71. Other commentators called for the
implementation of bilateral agreements in the international trades. See, e.g., R.
Daschbach, Chairman, Federal Maritime Comm'n, Remarks Before the Caribbean
Shipping Associations, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (Oct. 23, 1979), reprinted
in 11 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 387, 393 (1980). A brief summary of United States bilateral
maritime agreements with Brazil, Argentina, and the People's Republic of China is contained in SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 94-96.
55. See, e.g., Closed Conferences and Shippers' Councils in the U.S. Liner Trades:
Hearings on H.R. 11422 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 266-70 (1978) [hereinafter Closed Conference Hearings](statement of John Evans, University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology). One-third of the world's conferences are open conferences. There are approximately 400 conferences worldwide. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra
note 5, at 24.
56. But cf. GAO Report, supra note 22, at 18.
57. See Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We
Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936, 947-48 (1987).
58. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 39, at 3 (statement of James C.
Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
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promise legislation recognizing an open conference system and reflecting
carrier, shipper, and Reagan Administration interests. The debate on the
conference system was thus not resolved, and Congress mandated review
of the issue again in 1990, timed for the beginning of a new
administration.59
In the interim, there has been a five year experiment known as the
Shipping Act of 1984. The Presidential Advisory Commission will not
only revisit the issues and the debate resulting in the 1984 Act, but also
examine the effectiveness of the 1984 Act itself. The Advisory Commission will have to address not only the questions of regulatory philosophy
raised by the debates over the 1984 Act, but, more important, whether
the nature of world trading patterns and the international transportation
industry have changed over the past five years in such a manner as to
require a fundamental re-evaluation of the way the industry is structured and regulated.
In some regards, the Advisory Commission faces a "chicken versus
egg" question. Are changes in the industry the result of changes in the
United States economy and trading patterns or of changes resulting from
the Shipping Act of 1984? In addition, bearing ii mind that Congress
rarely revisits the Shipping Acts, the Advisory Commission must determine whether the 1984 Act is adequate to meet the economic challenges
facing the United States over the next generation, challenges not fully
comprehended when the 1984 Act was passed.
B.

The Shipping Act of 1984

The Shipping Act of 1984 consists of three broad themes: the streamlined antitrust approval process for carriers; certain prohibited acts
designed to protect the system of common carriage and prevent market
abuses by shippers and carriers; and the market tools provided to shippers in exchange for the carriers' strengthened antitrust immunity. It is
in these compromises that the Shipping Act of 1984 differs from its predecessors. It is also in these provisions that the dialogue may have been
changed for the Presidential Advisory Commission.
1. Carrier Antitrust Immunity
The major benefit the 1984 Shipping Act provided to ocean common
carriers was a clarification and streamlining of the approval process for
ocean conference agreements. ° The primary complaint of ocean common
59.

46 U.S.C. app. § 1717.

60.

46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1703-1706; Remarks of Biaggi, supra note 8.
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carriers concerning the 1916 Shipping Act was the difficulty in obtaining
antitrust exemptions for their agreements and the uncertainty as to the
strength of those exemptions.61
Obtaining antitrust exemptions for conference agreements had been a
lengthy and expensive process under the 1916 Shipping Act because the
Supreme Court, in the case of Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 2 had imposed a public ,interest standard for the F.M.C.'s review and approval of such agreements. The socalled Svenska standard often meant years of administrative proceedings
and then judicial appeals before an agreement could be considered fully
effective."3
Carriers had argued that this process impeded the rationalization effects that were the primary benefit of the conference system. They sought
a repeal of the Svenska standard and a streamlined agreement approval
64
process.
The Shipping Act of 1984 provided ocean common carriers with the
expedited agreement approval process they had sought. The 1984 Act
models F.M.C. review of conference agreements on that portion of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act governing pre-merger clearance of proposed acquisitions and mergers.6 5 The 1984 Act requires the F.M.C. to review
agreements promptly. Unless special problems are encountered, the
F.M.C. has only a forty-five day period in which to review a proposed
agreement.66 Agreements take effect automatically, unless the F.M.C.
takes affirmative action rejecting an agreement on the grounds that it
does not meet statutory criteria, or unless the F.M.C. seeks to block the
agreement on the grounds that it is substantially anticompetitive. 6"
While the F.M.C. may seek additional information from filing persons, it may do so only when necessary to its statutory purpose.6 " Filing
persons may request an expedited approval of an agreement.6 9 In addi-

61.

Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 28, at 316-19.

62.

390 U.S. 238 (1968).

63. See also Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966);
Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
affd on other grounds sub nom., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1969).
64. Friedman & Devierno, supra note 28, at 324-34.
65. CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 30.
66. Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(c).
67. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1705(c), (g), (h).
68. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1705(c); (d); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 30-31.
69. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(e); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 30.
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tion, the 70F.M.C. may not limit the term of effectiveness of an
agreement.
For ocean common carriers and conferences, two of the most significant aspects of the 1984 Act's revised antitrust exemption process are the
new general standard under which agreements are reviewed and the limited role of the Justice Department in the approval process.
Under section 6(g) of the 1984 Act, the F.M.C. may seek an injunction if it determines that an agreement "is likely, by a reduction in competition, to produce an unreasonable reduction in transportation service
or an unreasonable increase in transportation cost." 71 This standard of
review allows the F.M.C. to review agreements other than on the basis
of a contravention of specific statutory prescriptions, but establishes a
threshold for a prompt approval of most generally accepted joint conduct
in ocean shipping. 2 In addition, the 1984 Act shifted the burden of
proof from the proponent carriers to the F.M.C. in applying the general
standard. 3
Equally important for conference advocates was the fact that the
F.M.C. was given sole responsibility for enforcing the general standard. 4 The F.M.C., rather than the Justice Department, represents the
F.M.C.'s interests in district court actions seeking an injunction against
carrier actions.7 5 Congress intended this limitation on the Justice Department's role in reviewing conference agreements and enforcing the
general standard in order to give carriers room to develop new and innovative cooperative ventures for dealing with rapidly changing technologies and customer needs. 6
Congress was also specific on what factors the F.M.C. could consider
as causing a substantial reduction in competition. 7 Congress noted that
the pro-competitive provisions of the 1984 Act, the shippers' legal tools
discussed below, 78 would serve to offset the potential reductions in competition that some conference agreements could present.7 9 A mere reduction in service, or an increase in costs, is not unreasonable under the
1984 Act.8

70. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(0;

CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 30.
46 U.S.C. app. § 17 05(g), (h).
72. CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 32.
73. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(g), (h).
74. CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 32.
75. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(h); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 32.
76. CONF.REP., supra note 8, at 32-33.
77. Id. at 32-37.
78. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
79. CONF. REP. supra note 8, at 34-35. See .infra part II, section B(3).
80. CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 34.

71.
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Instead, Congress stated that the F.M.C. must consider an agreement's effect on market share, the increase in costs to shippers, the reduction in frequency or quality' of service to shippers, the agreement's
effect on United States foreign policy and international comity, and the
agreement's efficiency-creating aspects. 8' The F.M.C.'s market share
analysis is not limited just to ocean common carrier direct service in a
trade, but also includes a consideration of alternative means of transport,
such as alternative liner routings, bulk carriers, charter operators, or air
freight carriers.82
Congress also specified that the F.M.C. not engage in a public utility
or Interstate Commerce Commission ratemaking analysis in determining
whether the effect of a conference agreement would be unreasonable on
shippers. 8 For an agreement to be unreasonable in its effect on shippers,
it must have the potential of causing a meaningful and material change
in costs or services, weighed with the efficiencies inherent in the agreement or the potential of new market entrants who will compete with the
conferences.8 4
As under the 1916 Shipping Act, agreements authorized by the 1984
Act are entitled to an exemption from the antitrust laws. 5 The type of
agreements authorized under the 1984 Act are similar to those previously allowed under the 1916 Act. 6 Under the 1984 Act, ocean common
carriers may control, regulate, or prevent competition in international /
ocean transportation by discussing, fixing, or regulating transportation
rates, including through rates, cargo space accommodations, and other
conditions of service;8" by pooling or apportioning traffic, revenues, earnings, or leases; 8 by allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating
the number and character of sailings between ports;8 9 by limiting or regulating the volume or character of cargo; 90 and by regulating or prohibit81.
82.
83.
84.
under

Id. at 34-36.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. As a practical matter the F.M.C. has not had occasion to seek an injunction
the section 6(g) standard in the five years since enactment of the 1984 Act. The

F.M.C. attributes this to overtonnaging in the United States trades, which reduces the

possibility of unreasonable rate increases. In addition, independent action and F.M.C.
negotiations with conferences have precluded the need for enforcement actions. See SEcTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 113-19.
85. Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706.
86. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703; CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 28.
87. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(1).
88. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(2).
89. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(3).
90. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(4).
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ing the use of service contracts.9 1 In addition, ocean common carriers
may also engage in exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangements among themselves or with one or more marine terminal operators or nonvessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs).92
Thus, agreements filed under the Shipping Act of 1984 are exempt
from an application of the antitrust laws. 93 To provide greater predictability for ocean common carriers, any activity or agreement within the
scope of the 1984 Act undertaken with a reasonable basis to conclude
that it is pursuant to an agreement on file and in effect at the time the
activity occurs, or is exempt from a filing requirement, is exempt from
the antitrust laws, whether the 1984 Act permits or prohibits the activity
itself."' Congress has stated that the "reasonable basis to conclude" test
is an objective one and that the actual belief of the parties at the time of
the conduct will not control.
The 1984 Act provides an even broader antitrust exemption for ocean
common carriers. First, the 1984 Act specifically provides that any determination by an agency or court resulting in a denial or removal of the
antitrust laws does not remove or alter the immunity for the period
before the determinationY Second, the 1984 Act eliminates the threat of
private antitrust suits against carriers and provides remedies for violation
only through the 1984 Act itself. Under section 7(c)(2) of the 1984 Act,
no person may recover damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act after
obtaining injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act for conduct prohibited by the 1984 Act.97
The Shipping Act of 1984 provides for important exceptions to the
antitrust immunity it confers.9 8 For example, the 1984 Act does not extend antitrust immunity to any agreement with or among domestic surface, water, or air carriers with respect to transportation within the
United States.99 Similarly, no antitrust immunity exists for any discussion or agreement among common carriers subject to the 1984 Act that
regards the inland divisions of through rates within the United States,

46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(7).
46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(5).
46 U.S.C. app. § 1706.
94. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(2); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 37.
91.
92.
93.

8, at 37.
§ 1706(b).
§ 1706(b)(1).
§ 1706(b)(2).
§ 1706(c).

95.

CONF. REP., supra note

96.
97.
98.
99.

46
46
46
46

U.S.C. app.
U.S.C. app.
U.S.C. app.
U.S.C. app.
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although such an immunity may exist for the inland portions of such
rates.1 00
2.

Protection Against Market Abuses

The Shipping Act of 1984 contains enumerated prohibitions against
certain practices of both carriers and shippers. Congress incorporated
most of these prohibitions from the 1916 Act. 1 They are primarily
designed to achieve two key goals: preservation of the common carriage
system of ocean transportation, as reflected in the tariff and service contract system created by the 1984 Act; and prevention of carrier abuse of
market power.1 2
In furtherance of the system of common carriage it embodies, the 1984
Act prohibits both shippers and carriers from deviating from the tariff or
contract rates applicable to any given shipment.' 0 3 In addition, carriers
may not discriminate against or show preference to shippers.' 4 An exception to this rule exists for service contracts, although the "essential
terms" provision of contract filing preserves some aspects of the common
carriage element of service contract movements.' 0 5
The other key prohibitions contained in the 1984 Act address the
question of conference abuse of market power.' 6 Prohibitions on the use
0
of "fighting ships,"'1 0 7 deferred rebates,"'
and loyalty contracts'0 " have
100.

46 U.S.C. app. § 1706(c)(2).

101. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 28, at 335.
102. The majority of prohibited acts contained in the statute address the problem of
rebating, that is, the question of deviation from the applicable filed tariff or contract rate.
The policy goal is to protect against discrimination. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v.
Hansen & Tidemann, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 910, 918 (E.D. La. 1972). Other prohibitions
in the 1984 Act address the use of market tools employed by carriers to limit market
entry, for example, the use of loyalty contracts or fighting ships. Cf. Friedmann &
Devierno, supra note 28, at 335-38.
103. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(1); (b)(1), (2), (4).
104. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6); (c)(1).
105. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. (b)(6); (b)(11); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 40. Congress's
desire to preserve a semblance of common carriage even as regards the service contract
provisions of the Shipping Act are seen in the essential terms provisions of the 1984 Act.
Under section 8(c) of the 1984 Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(c), service contracts are confidentially filed with the F.M.C., but summaries of their essential terms filed in tariff
format with the F.M.C. must be made available to all "shippers similarly situated."
Congress stated that it expected the F.M.C. to be cognizant of the common carrier concepts upon which the Shipping Act is based when administering the essential terms provisions of the service contract portions of the 1984 Act. See H. REP. No. 611, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26, pt. 1, at 26 (1982).
106. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(a)(2),(3); § 1709(b)(5), (10), (11), (12), (13),
(14); § 1709(c)(1),(3).

107.

46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(7). A "'fighting ship' [is] a vessel used in a particular
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their antecedents in provisions of the 1916 Act.110 Each of these devices
is a means by which a carrier or conference can limit market entry or
restrict shippers' freedom of choice. 1
The 1984 Act also specifically addresses prohibitions on conferences'
attempts to interfere with their members' right to offer intermodal services.'" 2 The 1984 Act contains specific prohibitions against joint ocean
carrier negotiations with domestic inland carriers, as well as the use of
through intermodal services and technology." 3
Penalties for engaging in any prohibited act may range from $5,000 to
$25,000 for knowingly and willfully committed violations." 4 Each day of
a continuing violation constitutes a separate offense." 5 In addition, the
F.M.C. may suspend the tariffs of a carrier, including the right to use
trade by an ocean common carrier or group of such carriers for . . . excluding, preventing, or reducing competition by driving another ocean common carrier out of that trade."
46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(10).
108. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(8). A deferred rebate is "a return by a common carrier of any portion of the freight money to a shipper as a consideration for that shipper
giving all, or any portion, of its shipments to that or any other common carrier, or for
any other purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the completion of the service
for which it is paid, and is made only if ...the shipper has complied with the terms of
the rebate agreement . . . ." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(9).
109. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(9). A loyalty contract is "a contract with an ocean
common carrier or conference, other than a service contract or contract based upon timevolume rates, by which a shipper obtains lower rates by committing all or a fixed portion
of its cargo to that carrier or conference." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(14). The F.M.C. has
taken the position that loyalty contracts are illegal unless some form of Justice Department approval of the agreement has been demonstrated, for example, through the use of
the business review letter process. 46 C.F.R. § 580.16(b) (1989). The Justice Department has stated that loyalty contracts between a single carrier and shipper will most
likely survive antitrust scrutiny. Letter from Charles F. Rule, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen.,
Dept. of Justice, to Chemical Manufacturers Association, reprinted in 24 Shipping Reg.
(P&F) 199 (1987). See generally Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 28, at 335-36.
One key question is whether conferences can prohibit their members from exercising
independent action in entering into loyalty contracts. Under the 1984 Act, conferences
have such a right regarding service contracts. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(7). The F.M.C.
has ruled that conferences have a similar authority regarding loyalty contracts, notwithstanding the fact that loyalty contracts are distinguished from service contracts under the
1984 Act. Agreement Provisions on Loyalty Contracts, 24 Shipping Reg. (P&F) 1395
(1988) (F.M.C. Dkt. Nos. 87-26, 88-1). An appeal of the decision is currently pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
110. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 28, at 335.
111. Id. at 336-37.
112. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(c)(2), (4).
113. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(c)(4).
114. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1712.
115. Id.
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any applicable conference tariffs, for a period of up to twelve months
should a carrier engage in any conduct resulting in deviations from the
applicable tariff or service contract rates." 6 Handling cargo under a suspended tariff subjects a carrier to potential penalties of up to $50,000 for
each shipment."'
3.

The Shipper Compromises and the Changed Dialogue

While the 1984 Act's provisions for a streamlined agreement approval
process represent a major victory for carriers in strengthening the conference system, reducing legal costs, and otherwise accomplishing the shipping industry's legislative goals of the late 1970s, these provisions basically are revisions to the Shipping Act of 1916.1"
It is in the new marketing tools, and the limits placed on conference
powers, that the Shipping Act of 1984 represents a marked departure
from previous shipping statutes. These provisions have generated the
greatest controversy and will command the greatest attention of the Presidential Advisory Commission.
These provisions include a mandatory right of independent action by
conference members," 9 the right to enter into service contracts with
shippers, 2 ' and the right for shippers to form shippers' associations. 21
While each of these provisions are important legal tools enabling shippers to obtain lower rates, they have also raised key questions as to the
strength of, and continued need for, the conference system.
a.

Independent action

The right of independent action is one of the most controversial provisions of the 1984 Act.' It is the antithesis of a closed conference system
and reflects a free market system that tolerates, but does not necessarily
sanction, cartels. 2
116. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1712(b)(1).
117. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1712(b)(3).
118. CONF. REP. supra note 8, at 28-30.
119. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1704(b)(8); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 29.
120. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(c).
121. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(24).
122. See part III, section B(4)(a).
123. Conferences argue that mandatory independent action is inconsistent with the
concept of conferences because it undermines a conference's ability to stabilize rates.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the Senate Comm. on Com.,
Science, and Transp. on S. 1593 and S. 125, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1981) (statement of Henry De La Trobe, Vice Chairman, Council of European and Japanese Shipowners' Associations). Independent action, however, has been a fundamental feature of
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Simply stated, independent action is the right of any conference member to act independently of the conference upon giving the conference
timely notice of its action. Under the 1984 Act, each conference must
allow its members the right of independent action on tariff rate and service items on ten calendar days notice.124 When a conference member
chooses to exercise its right, the conference may choose to adopt the ac1 25
tion. The right does not extend, however, to service contract matters.
The mandatory right of independent action existed in the ocean shipping industry prior to 1984, but only for inter-conference agreements,
that is, agreements between two or more conferences. The right to exercise independent action was not mandatory as between a conference and
its members. 126 In the domestic transportation market, however, the
mandatory right of independent action existed in rate bureau agreements
among carriers authorized under the Interstate Commerce Act. 12 The
purpose was to ensure carrier competition notwithstanding their ability
to act collectively pursuant to an exempt agreement under the antitrust
laws.' 28 Inclusion of such a provision in the Shipping Act of 1984 was
one method of limiting the antitrust immunity enjoyed by conferences,
although it was opposed by carrier interests.' 2 9 The introduction of independent action into the conference system was an implicit congressional
decision to treat the conference system similarly to the domestic transportation system, despite conscious past decisions that the two systems be
treated differently.'
b.

Service contracts

Service contracts will be a key focal point of Advisory Commission
examination. The Shipping Act of 1984 has allowed, for the first time,
the right of shippers and carriers to contract outside of a tariff. A service
contract is a contract between a shipper and an ocean common carrier or

domestic transportation industry rate bureaus. See infra note 127.
124. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1704(b)(8); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 29.
125. CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 29-30.
126. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982) (amended 1984). Some conferences, however, did allow
independent action prior to 1984. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 657.
127. 49 U.S.C. § 10,706(d)(2)(C) (1982).

128. See,

e.g., VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS

§ 57.03(1) (1989).
129. See supra note 123.
130. See Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 28, at 340-44. Friedman and Devierno
argue that conferences, unlike the motor carrier industry, may limit indpendent action
since the Shipping Act of 1984 does not specifically prohibit conference interference with
an independent carrier action. Id.
AND TRADE REGULATIONS
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conference in which the shipper makes a commitment to provide a certain minimum quantity of cargo over a fixed period of time, and the
ocean common carrier or conference commits to a certain rate or rate
schedule and a defined service level. 131
Under the 1916 Act, as amended, carriers and shippers could enter
into either time/volume or dual rate contracts. 13 2 A time/volume rate is
a tariff rate giving the shipper a rate reduction in exchange for a certain
percentage of cargo over time.' 33 A dual rate contract, on the other hand,
is a form of requirements contract. In exchange for committing all or a
fixed percentage of its cargo, the shipper receives a reduced freight
34
rate.1
Early versions of the Shipping Act of 1984 proposed to retain dual
rate contracts as a form of loyalty contract.'3 5 Since such contracts are
often disfavored under the antitrust laws, however, Congress ultimately
36
prohibited their use unless in conformance with the antitrust laws.'

Congress instead preferred the service contract as a method of interjecting competition into ocean shipping. Carriers would have volume
commitments from shippers in exchange for service and rate guarantees.
Shippers would be able to negotiate their own service needs on the basis
of their ability to bargain with carriers and conferences. As enacted, the
service contract provided benefits for carriers, shippers, free trade advocates, and advocates of a common carrier system. Competition existed
because shippers and carriers could negotiate their own contracts outside
of the tariff system. Elements of common carriage were preserved, however, because service contracts were confidentially filed with the F.M.C.
and their essential terms made publicly available to similarly-situated
shippers.13 7 Both shippers and carriers could make long-term marketing
plans based on known shipping commitments. Conferences retained an
element of control over the system by being allowed to prohibit their
38
members' use of service contracts.1

131. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(21); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 29.
132. 46 U.S.C. 813a (1982), repealed, Act of Mar. 20, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, §
20(a), 98 Stat. 88.
133. 46 C.F.R. § 536 (1983); 46 C.F.R. § 580 (1988). See Friedman & Devierno,
supra note 28, at 347-48.
134. 46 U.S.C. 813a (1982) (repealed 1984).
135. S. 47, supra note 7, § 7(a)(1); H.R. 1878, supra note 7, § 6 (1983).
136.

Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(9). See also HouseJudiciary

Hearings,supra note 39, at 9 (statment of James C. Miller III).
137.

H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 137, at 17. See also S. REP. No. 3, supra note

26, at 16, 21; H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 105, pt. 1, at 25-26.
138.

46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(7). Congress explicitly stated that conferences do not
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c. Shippers' associations
Shippers' associations were a last-minute compromise in the 1984
Act.139 They have proven controversial in practice.1 40 Congress intended
that shippers' associations would provide a competitive alternative for the
small and medium-sized shipper to obtain volume rate discounts and
enter into service contracts. Shippers' associations have existed in the domestic transportation industry since the turn of the century1 4 1 and were
explicitly granted an exemption from regulation under the Interstate
Commerce Act from 1942 through 1986, when Congress deregulated the
intermodal intermediary market in the Surface Freight Forwarder Act of
1986.142 Prior to 1984, however, the F.M.C. refused to distinguish between shippers' associations and nonvessel operating common carriers
(NVOCCs), and it required them to file tariffs. 143 The 1984 Act recoghave to provide their members with a right to independent action on service contracts.
See CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 29-30.
139. None of the bills preceding the final version of the Shipping Act of 1984 contained any provisions recognizing shippers' associations. For a listing of these bills, see
supra note 7.
140. A substantial number of regulatory proceedings have been initiated at the
F.M.C. concerning the role of shippers' associations in the international trades. See
Status of Shippers' Associations Under the Shipping Act, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,799
(F.M.C. 1984); Order Denying Petition for an Amended Statement of Policy Concerning
the Status of Shippers' Associations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7225 (F.M.C. 1985) (petition brought
by the American Institute for Shippers' Associations, Inc.) [hereinafter AISA Petition];
Petition for Rulemaking Concerning Shippers' Associations, 50 Fed. Reg. 6249 (F.M.C.
1985) (brought by the Associated Latin American Freight Conferences and Others); In
re Petition of U.S. Atlantic-North Europe Conferences and the North Europe-U.S. Atlantic Conference for a Rule Regarding the Term "Shipper," 23 Shipping Reg. (P&F)
1381 (F.M.C. Order 1986); Interpretation and Statement of Policy on the Use of Business Review Letters by Conferences, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,696 (F.M.C. 1988).
141. The first reported Supreme Court decision involving shippers' associations was
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R., 220 U.S. 235
(1911), in which the Court held that it was unlawful for common carriers to discriminate
against associations of shippers on the basis that they are freight consolidators.
142. 49 U.S.C. § 10,562(3) (1982), repealed by Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-521, § 6(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2994. The exemption from
regulation existed to distinguish shippers' associations from surface freight forwarders.
The latter were accorded a common carrier status under the law because they offered
their services to the general public. Shippers' associations, by way of contrast, are membership-limited organizations. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 69, 70 (testimony of
Ronald N. Cobert, General Counsel, American Institute for Shippers' Associations, Inc.).
143. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 70. An NVOCC is a freight intermediary
that holds itself out to the general public to provide ocean common carrier services. In
general, NVOCCs consolidate less-than-containerload freight of small shippers. Thus,
they hold themselves out as a carrier when dealing with the shipper, but act as a shipper
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nized shippers' associations as being allowed to participate in the international trades. 4
In some ways, the 1984 Act's shippers' association provisions illustrate
the conflicting goals the Advisory Commission will have to reconcile.
When Congress initially contemplated changes to the regulation of the
conference system, one alternative was the possible use of shippers' councils in the United States trades as a means of offsetting or counterbalancing the collective power of the conferences. 4 5 Shippers' councils, which
exist in many United States trading partner countries, are shipper trade
groups that discuss freight rates and transportation services with carriers
and conferences. While shippers' councils may recommend the use or
nonuse of a given carrier, they do not engage in the actual operational
aspects of transportation shipments. 46
The UNCTAD Code strongly advocated the use of shippers' councils
as a means of protecting shippers' interests and limiting the power of
conferences.' 47 Early versions of the Shipping Act of 1984 contained provisions authorizing the creation of United States-based shippers' councils.
These councils would have had an exemption from the United States
antitrust laws similar to that provided to the conferences.'4 "
Opposition to the proposed antitrust immunity for shippers' councils
led to the recognition of shippers' associations in the 1984 Act to provide
small and medium-sized shippers some negotiating power with confer-

in tendering freight to ocean common carriers. Because NVOCCs assume common carrier obligations in dealing with shippers, they are required to file tariffs with the F.M.C.
A creation of F.M.C. regulations, NVOCCs were first statutorily recognized in the Shipping Act of 1984. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(17).
144. 46 U.S.C. § 1702(24); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 27-28.
145. See, e.g., S. 47, supra note 7, § 7(d); 129 CONG. REC. S1779 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1983) (comments of Sen. Gorton); Comment, supra note 53, at 99. See generally Danas,
Deregulationof the Liner Conference System: The Creation of CountervailingPower in
Shippers as a Means to Control Oligopoly Market Power, 6 Nw. J. INT. L. & Bus. 373
(1984).
146. See Closed Conference Hearings, supra note 55, at 233 (statement of Bengt
Jobin, European National Shippers' Council); Hearings on S. 1593 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the Senate Comm. on Com., Science, and Transp., 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1981) [hereinafter Gorton Hearings] (Testimony of J.F. Muheim,
European National Shippers' Council).

147. UNCTAD, SHIPPER INTERESTS, supra note 52; UNCTAD, CONSULTATION
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/20/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 68.II.D.1 (1967);

IN SHIPPING,

UNCTAD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHIPPERS' ORGANIZATIONS, U.N. Doc. TD/B/

C.4/154 (1976).
148. See, e.g., S. 47, supra note 7, § 4(c), Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 12; S.
1593, supra note 7, § 5(d)(1); Danas, supra note 145, at 400-11.
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ences.' 49 In addition to defining shippers' associations as entities distinct
and separate from ocean freight forwarders and NVOCCs, the 1984 Act
gave associations an explicit right to enter into service contracts and specifically prohibited ocean carriers from refusing to negotiate with
them. 150
Notwithstanding the fact that shippers' associations have a long history in the domestic transportation market, and the fact that the statutory definition provides that they will consolidate and distribute freight,
two types of shippers' associations have developed in the international
trades since 1984.1a One is the traditional, domestic full service shippers' association, which physically consolidates and distributes freight for
its members. It may engage in physical transportation operations and
own its own equipment, terminal facilities, and warehouses.' 5 2
The second type of association, unique to the international trades, is
the rate negotiator shippers' association. This type of shippers' association negotiates freight rates and service contracts for its members, but
actual shipments, invoicing, and payment are handled directly between
53
the shipper and the carrier.'
Shippers' associations have been controversial. Associations, especially
rate negotiator associations, have claimed that conferences and carriers
have discriminated against them.' 54 Such discrimination has allegedly
consisted of requiring unreasonable evidence of the association's bona
fide status prior to entering into service contract negotiations.' 5 5 Associations have also alleged more subtle forms of discrimination, such as selectively offering independent action to the larger members of the associa-

149. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(24); CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 27-28.
150. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(c); 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(13). NVOCCs were also
statutorily recognized for the first time. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(17). See supra note 143.
151. F.M.C., REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY OFFICER FACT FINDING No. 15,
PRACTICES OF VARIOUS ENTITIES OPERATING AS INTERMEDIARIES FOR THE TRANS-

PORTATION OF GOODS IN THE UNITED STATES WATERBORNE FOREIGN COMMERCE

16-17 (Sept. 2, 1988) [hereinafter FACT FINDING 15], reprinted in 24 Shipping Reg.
(P&F) 1197 (1988).
152. FACT FINDING 15, supra note 151, at 15-16.
153. Id. at 17.
154. Id. at 33-34; Statement of Position on the Shipping Act of 1984 Submitted by
the Shippers' Association Study Group [hereinafter Shippers' Asocation Position Paper],
reprinted in SECTION 18 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 33, 37-39; SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 136-38.
155. FACT FINDING 15, supra note 151, at 33-34; F.M.C., Interpretation and Statement of Policy on the use of Business Review Letters by Conferences, 53 Fed. Reg.
43,696 (1988); Shippers' Association Position Paper, supra note 154, at 39-40.
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tion in order to undermine the association's freight base.1" 6
Early F.M.C. surveys indicate that associations have been slow to develop in the international trades but are increasing their market presence. 5" The Advisory Commission will have to determine whether this
slow growth is the result of a lack of shipper interest, depressed freight
rates, carrier discrimination, management flaws in associations, regulatory impediments, or inherent lead times related to penetrating the international markets.
Shippers' associations are a long-established player in the domestic
transportation market. The Advisory Commission, in reviewing the conference system and the 1984 Act, must carefully examine the role of
shippers' associations in the international trades. As the only entity that
has had the same legal status under both the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Shipping Act, associations illustrate a basic question for the Advisory Commission: should United States regulation of the international
transportation industry be coordinated more with the United States domestic transportation laws, or should the industry remain unique?
III.

AN AGENDA FOR THE ADVISORY COMMISSION

Section 18 of the Shipping Act of 1984 requires the Presidential Advisory Commission to examine and report to Congress on conferences in
ocean shipping.' 58 The report shall specifically address whether the
United States would be best served by a prohibition of conferences or by
closed or open conferences.' 59 In addition, the 1984 Act mandates the
F.M.C. to study and report on three key issues: the need for tariff filing
in the international trades; the continued need for marine terminal antitrust immunity; and the need for tariffs based on volume and mass of
shipment. 6 The F.M.C. will then submit its report to the Advisory
Commission.'
To assist in the preparation of its section 18 report, the F.M.C. asked
156.

Shippers' Association Position Paper, supra note 154, at 40; FACT FINDING 15,

supra note 151, at 34.
157. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. FED. MARITIME COMM'N, SECTION
18 STUDY, SUMMARY OF 1987 SURVEY RESULTS 17-18 (1987); SECTION 18 REPORT,
supra note 5, at 135.
158. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(f).
159. Id.; CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 43.
160. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(c)(3).
161. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(c)(1). The F.M.C.'s report will also be submitted to the
Department of Transportation, the Justice Department, and the F.T.C., each of which
will have 60 days to furnish an analysis of the impact of the 1984 Act to Congress and to
the Advisory Commission. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(c)(2).
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representatives of the key segments of the international transportation
community to form study groups. Separate study groups for shippers,
shippers' associations, ports, NVOCCs, ocean freight forwarders, and
carriers and conferences assisted the F.M.C. in preparing industry
surveys and comments on industry survey results. In addition, each
g&oup selected members who were appointed to a thirty-two member
section 18 advisory committee, which held two public meetings with the
F.M.C. on the progress of the F.M.C. reports. 1 2 As part of the section
18 advisory process, each study group presented position papers on the
Shipping Act of 1984.63

In the course of the F.M.C. advisory process, a group of large international shippers called for an abolition of the conference system, citing
major changes in world trading patterns and the international and domestic transportation industries.1 " 4 As did the Alexander Commission of
1914, the Advisory Commission is examining United States regulation of
the liner shipping industry at a time of fundamental changes in the domestic United States transportation system and in United States trading
patterns and the world economy. The Alexander Commission laid a
foundation for the regulation of the ocean liner industry for the majority
of this century. The Advisory Commission should perform the same
function for the 21st century. It should identify and provide Congress
with a blueprint of the direction the industry is heading and how it
should be regulated in the 21st century. It should determine how transportation fits into the changing world trading patterns and the competitiveness of global corporations of the next century.
The Advisory Commission may determine that the 1984 Act is an admirable piece of legislation that needs no changes, or only a few adjustments, to ensure a smoothly functioning international transportation industry in the next century. On the other hand, the Advisory Commission
may determine that the statute is inadequate and that either a stronger
conference system, or no conference system, must be adopted. The Advisory Commission's job is to put the discrete provisions of the 1984 Act
into the broader perspective of the international economic arena.

162. One public meeting of the Advisory Committee was held on March 24, 1988.
The second meeting was held on April 6, 1989. See F.M.C., Notice of Meeting of Section 18 Study Advisory Committee, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,049 (Mar. 9, 1989).
163. Position papers were submitted by shippers, shippers' associations, NVOCCs,
carriers and conferences, ocean freight forwarders, nonport marine terminal operators,
and ports. Replies and surreplies were also allowed by the F.M.C. SECTION 18 PROCEEDINGS (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 14.
164. Shipper Position Paper, supra note 14, at 5-14.
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The Consolidated Intermodal Transportation Industry and the
Emerging Trading Blocs of Europe and the Pacific Rim

Two broad economic trends frame the Advisory Commission's mandate: the simplification of trading patterns and the consolidation and interconnection of the world transportation market. The trend since 1984
has been towards consolidation and integration of the domestic and international United States transportation markets. Similar trends are affecting United States trading partners. At the same time, Europe and the
Pacific Rim nations have emerged as strong regional trading blocs having
a substantial influence on the United States economy. Interpretation of
these trends will determine whether the 1984 Act is deemed a success or
failure and also will determine the future of the conference system.
Since 1984 a system of integrated international transportation networks serviced by multimodal, multinational transportation conglomerates has begun to develop. This trend can be attributed both to changes
in the law promoting the development of through multimodal intermodal
transportation and to changing worldwide economic patterns.
International trade, especially imports, became an important segment
of the United States economy in the 1980s. At approximately the same
time the Shipping Act of 1984 was impremented, the United States trade
deficit began to worsen significantly. 5 The cause of this trade deficit is
a source of political dispute. Some argue that it results from the United
States budget deficit; others argue that it results from unfair trading
practices by foreign competitors.16 Whatever the cause, the trade deficit
obviously affects ocean shipping, its profitability, and its stability. It will
thus affect any analysis of the success or failure of the Shipping Act of

165. The Commerce Department reported that in 1988, the United States merchandise trade deficit was $137.3 billion, a $33 billion reduction from the previous year. The
improvement was attributed to a 27% increase in exports in 1987, to $322.2 billion.
Imports in 1988 also increased to $459.6 billion. In 1987 the United States experienced a
record trade deficit of $170.3 billion. 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 223 (Feb. 2, 1989). See
also SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 41-46.
166. See, e.g., Holmer, The Office of the Trade Representative: Recent Legal Developments, 20 INT'L LAW. 1351 (1986); McMinn, Competitiveness in America: Is Protectionism the Answer?, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 56 (Aug. 1987); Yeutter, U.S. Trade Policy
and the Trade Deficit, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 20 (1987); White, Trade Effects of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 289 (1987); Kubarych, Trade Policy and the
Dollar,18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1113 (1986); Stewart, Existing Remedies and the
Trade Deficit: The Promise of Reform Through JudicialReview, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 1165 (1986); Niskanen, The Uneasy Relation Between the Budget and Trade
Deficits, 8 CATO J. 507 (1988); Stern, Budget Policy and the Economy, 8 CATO J. 521
(1988).
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1984. Since 1984 the shipping industry has seen major bankruptcies, 16 7
depressed rates, and rate wars. 6 ' Conferences have also experienced differing fortunes, depending on the fate of their trades.' 69 Determining
whether these events resulted from inadequacies in the Shipping Act of
1984 or from general trade conditions will be the job of the Presidential
Advisory Commission.
One result of these changing and uncertain market conditions has been
a trend by conferences in both the Atlantic and Pacific trades to consolidate their operations, pursuant to the new freedoms allowed by the Shipping Act of 1984. There are now four major conferences in these two
trades.' Underlying this effort at increased rationalization is the desire
to control freight. One visible means by which the United States trade
imbalance with newly-industrialized countries has affected steamship operators and conference policies is that Hyundai cars imported to the
United States may be carried on Hyundai-built steamships operated by
the Hyundai Line. In the post-1984 era, the control of freight for the
entire transportation movement has become increasingly important to the
success of the international transportation company.'

167. For example, on November 24, 1986, United States Lines, Inc. and United
States Lines (S.A.) Inc., each filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. Combined, these two corporations operated one of the
largest container lines and cargo shipping companies in the world. See In re McLean
Indus., 87 Bankr. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Prudential Lines, Inc., was placed in involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 12, 1985. See In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 69
Bankr. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
168. Conferences claim that rates have fallen 25% since 1984, and as much as 40%
when adjusted for inflation. Shippers dispute these claims. Armbruster, Shiplines Report
Rates Off Sharply, J. COM., Sept. 1, 1989, at 1A, col. 1. The F.M.C. has noted rate
instability in some trades, but has attributed that instability to changes in trading patterns and exchange rates. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 155-204.
169. For example, the weaker dollar in 1988 and 1989 contributed to a decline in
demand for imports into the United States. This, in turn, resulted in a weakening of
rates of the inbound trades from Pacific Rim countries to the United States West Coast,
adversely affecting the stability of the Asia North American Eastbound Rate Agreement.
A subsequent agreement to reduce capacity in the trade by 10% assisted the conference in
stabilizing rates. See Pacific Carriers'Revenue Strategy, AMERICAN SHIPPER 14 (Jan.
1989); Pacific Capacity Reduction Plan, AMERICAN SHIPPER 16-18 (Jan. 1989).
170. As of August 1, 1989, in the Pacific trades these conferences were the Asia
North American Eastbound Rate Agreement and the Transpacific Westbound Rate
Agreement. In the North Atlantic trades, these conferences are the North-Europe-USA
Rate Agreement and the USA-North Europe Rate Agreement. AMERICAN SHIPPER 10
(July, 1989). See also SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 108-13.
171. See generally Bowman, Partnershipping, WORLD TRADE 34 (Fall 1989);
Canna, Full Service Logistics, AMERICAN SHIPPER 56 (June 1989).
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Emergence of the unified, borderless European Common Market at
the end of 1992 has also placed increased emphasis on the ability of
carriers to control freight at its source. The crucial competitive importance of such control in the global transportation market has not been
lost on carriers in Europe, where the creation of a single common market
and the elimination of national transportation barriers has led to a wave
of mergers and acquisitions in Europe; this may result in several giant
transportation conglomerates operating multiple modes of transportation,
including trucks, air carriers, and ocean fleets.1 2
The advantages of such mergers are many: they permit a single carrier
to offer one-stop door-to-door transportation services to its customers.1 73
In addition, other value added services may be provided that aid the
shipper in the manufacture, sale, and shipment of its goods. 7 4 However,
the effective operation of such transportation giants requires the existence of large unitary markets with few regulatory barriers to the multimodal operation of equipment. The emerging single European market
presents the potential for such a market. In Europe, differing national
laws, state ownership of carriers, and geography have limited development of an integrated intermodal market. To create such a market, the
European Community has adopted or proposed the elimination of internal cabotage laws and harmonization of paperwork requirements. Key to
accomplishing these goals is a loosening of cross-border truck transportation restrictions and an application of general European Community antitrust regulations to transportation, including ocean transportation. 7 5
Technological changes and the Shipping Act of 1984 have created a
similar environment in the United States domestic transportation market.
Simply stated, the containerization of freight and the elimination of regulatory barriers to through intermodal shipments have initiated major
172.

Gish, Safety in Numbers, WORLD TRADE 67 (Fall 1989); Stoner, Nedlioyd
WORLD, July 17, 1989, at

Consolidates Strength as EEC Transport Leader, TRAFFIC
32.

173. See supra notes 171-72.
174. See supra note 171. "Value added" services are the equivalent to the concept of
full service. In essence, if the shipper desires a service, the carrier will provide it or, if a
problem arises, the carrier will manage it. More common features of value added service
are the provision of electronic data interchange and warehousing services, which are especially important for just-in-time manufacturers who desire to maintain low inventory
levels. See generally It's New. It's Here ... It's Value Added ... Now on Sale in the
USA, CONTAINERISATION INT'L 55-61 (Sept. 1988).
175. A keystone to the European Community's proposal of a unified internal market
is the elimination of crossborder barriers to transportation. This primarily means deregulation of the European transportation industry. See generally C. DEGLI ABBATI, TRANSPORT AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1986).
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changes in the United States transportation market. Prior to 1984, the
legal ability of ocean carriers to offer through intermodal rates was uncertain. The Justice Department opposed the ability of conferences to
establish through intermodal rates because of different regulatory standards under the Interstate Commerce Act and the Shipping Act of 1984.
A major concern of the Justice Department was the potential of "domestic spillover" of anticompetitive activity of conferences providing such

services.?76

As previously noted, the ability to move manufactured commodities
easily and quickly from one mode of transportation to another had been
improving in the United States since the late 1950s.' 77 At that time, containerization, the movement of freight using containers or trailers that
can be placed either on a rail flatcar or a motor carrier chassis, began to
increase.178 In November 1981 the Interstate Commerce Commission
deregulated rail-provided TOFC/COFC traffic, and intermodal rail-motor shipments increased.' 79
The Shipping Act of 1984 has provided an analogous regulatory freedom for ocean carriers and conferences to take advantage of these technological innovations. Ocean carriers and conferences can offer through
rates, although only individual carriers, and not conferences, can establish the inland divisions with rail and motor carriers."18 Through in-

176. See supra note 42.
177. See GAO Report, supra note 22, at 12.
178. See Tombari, supra note 22, at 311.
179. Carriers Involved in the Intermodal Movements of Containerized Freight, 46
Fed. Reg. 32,257 (I.C.C. 1981) [hereinafter Intermodal Movement].
180. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(a),(c). Under sections 8(a) and (c)of the 1984 Act,
carriers and conferences may offer rates on through transportation routes or through
intermodal movements, but shall not be required to state separately or otherwise reveal
in tariff filings the inland divisions of a through rate. Under the Shipping Act, a
"'through rate' means the single amount charged by a common carrier in connection
with through transportation." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(25). "'[T]hrough transportation'
means continuous transportation between origin and destination for which a through rate
is assessed and which is offered or performed by one or more carriers, at least one of
which is a common carrier, between a United States point or port and a foreign point or
port." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(26). The 1984 Act prohibits conferences or groups of two
or more carriers from negotiating with truck, rail, or air operators on any matters pertaining to rates or services on the United States segment of a movement. 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1709(c)(4).
The 1984 Act also does not extend an antitrust immunity "to any agreement with or
among air carriers, rail carriers, motor carriers, or common carriers by water not subject
to [the 1984 Act] with respect to transportation within the United States," or "to any
discussion or agreement among common carriers that are subject to [the Shipping Act]
regarding the inland divisions (as opposed to the inland portions) of through rates within
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termodal, rather than port-to-port, rates have become the competitive
norm, as ocean carriers offer Keelung to Dubuque rates under a single
tariff or service contract. To facilitate these shipments, steamship companies contract with rail carriers to offer double stack train services,
whereby the rail carrier operates the train in the name of the steamship
company."" 1
Such joint operations have aided the development of the multimodal
transportation company in the United States. Rail carriers have purchased steamship companies. 182 Steamship companies have purchased
domestic United States shippers' agents to ensure better marketing of
their services.s This activity complements rail and steamship carrier
acquisition of motor carriers.' 84
the United States." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706(b)(1)-(2).
An inland division is "the amount paid by a common carrier to an inland carrier for
the inland portion of through transportation offered to the public by the [ocean] common
carrier." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(12). An inland portion is the charge to the public by an
ocean common carrier for the nonocean portion of through transportation. 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1702(13).
181. As of January 1988, 10 steamship companies had weekly double stack eastbound departures from the United States West Coast. Of 76 total weekly trains, only 28
were operated by actual rail carriers. TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 18, 1988, at 6-7.
182. CSX purchased SeaLand Services in 1986. JointApplication of CSX Corp. and
Sea-Land Corp., 23 Shipping Reg. (P&F) 1671 (I.C.C., Fin. No. 30,900 (Sub.-No. 1)
(1987)). The combined corporation offers through ocean/rail services. See generally
Hintz at the Helm, CONTAINERISATION INT'L 30-37 (July 1988); CSXISea-Land In-

termodal Rolls Out,

CONTAINERISATION INT'L

48-49 (July 1988).

183. Prior to deregulation of the surface freight forwarder industry, a shippers' agent
was an entity exempt from regulation as a surface freight forwarder provided it acted as
an agent of the shipper in consolidating or distributing pool cars and it provided the
service for the shipper only at a terminal in which the service was performed. 49 U.S.C.
§ 10,62(4) (1982) repealed by Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-521, 100 Stat. 2993. See Travellers Indemn. Co. v. Alliance Shippers,
654 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Cal. 1986). As a practical matter, shippers' agents act in the
domestic rail market as "travel agents" for rail carriers. The agents act as retailers of the
wholesale rail services that they purchase. The leading example of a steamship/shippers'
agent acquisition was that of American President Companies/National Piggyback, Inc.
See generally Kursar, American President Domestic: A Matter of Organization, TRAFFIC WORLD

Apr. 18, 1988, at 8-10.

184. Examples of major rail-motor carrier acquisitions include the Union Pacific
Railroad purchase of Overnite Transportation Co., see 4 I.C.C. 2d 36 (Final Decision,
Fin. No. 31,000 1987), and the Burlington Northern Railroad's acquisition of six regional motor lines. Such acquisitions have been limited due to regulatory uncertainties
over the legal standards that the I.C.C. must apply in authorizing rail/motor mergers.
The Union Pacific and Burlington Northern acquisitions were allowed to proceed only
as a result of temporary enabling legislation enacted by Congress. See Regular Common
Carrier Conf. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating I.C.C.
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The result is the creation of multimodal transportation giants that offer coordinated and consolidated through transportation services to domestic and international shippers. The trend to provide integrated
through intermodal service is likely to continue, even if the trend towards
multimodal companies does not. This trend may have a significant impact upon the future of the conference system.
At issue is whether an antitrust-exempt conference system can be reconciled with the existence of a deregulated domestic transportation system if most international freight moves under through intermodal rates
under the control of a single multimodal carrier. At this time the multimodal carrier is the exception, not the norm. However, integrated point
to point through movements offered by conference carriers in conjunction
with domestic carriers are a significant aspect of the international market. While current law does not allow conferences to negotiate jointly
and establish the domestic inland portion of such through intermodal
rates, the rate charged to the public for the through movement can be
agreed upon by the conference members. The existing system thus provides shippers with an opportunity to establish their own rate structures
as competitive alternatives to a carrier's thirough rate, while still allowing
the conference system to rationalize some aspects of intermodal
services."a 5
Should the Advisory Commission determine that the trend towards integrated carrier systems will continue, thus leaving a handful of giants
dominating the world market, there may be serious arguments against
allowing a strengthened conference system under the theory that it will
have an undue influence over domestic competition. On the other hand,
if United States trading partners, especially the European Community,
continue to allow the conference system, there is an argument for political comity in favor of continuance of the conference system, an argument
that has been persuasive for over seventy years. 86
B.

The Advisory Commission's Mandate

The Advisory Commission has, of course, a specific mandate to examine certain issues that were of primary concern to Congress in 1984.
approval of rail/motor acquisitions under exemption authority and requiring review
under acquisitions authority). See also Norfolk Southern Corporation-Control-North
American Van Lines, Inc., 1 I.C.C. 2d 842 (Fin. No. 30,500) remanded sub nom. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Interstate Com. Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1423 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
185. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(c)(4). See supra note 180.
186. Cf GAO Report, supra note 22, at 18.
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The Commission's overriding mandate is to study and make recommendations concerning conferences in ocean shipping. The study is to address specifically whether the nation would be best served by prohibiting
conferences or by maintaining closed or open conferences."7
The Advisory Commission's perception of the changing transportation
market and world trading patterns, their source, their direction, and
their impact on the United States, will determine the recommendations it
makes to Congress. These trends must be put in the perspective of the
conference system, whose key justification is that it provides rate and
service stability to shippers.
1. The F.M.C. Section 18 Report
In this regard, Congress has provided additional guidance for the Advisory Commission. In staff reports ordered by the Shipping Act of 1984,
Congress required the F.M.C. to collect and analyze information on the
impact of the 1984 Act on international ocean shipping, including data
on increases and decreases in the level of tariffs; changes in the frequency and type of common carrier services available through specific
ports or geographic regions; the number and strength of independent
carriers in various trades; and the length, time, frequency, and cost of
major regulatory proceedings before the F.M.C..' 8 8
In addition, the F.M.C. was required to submit a report based on this
data to the Presidential Advisory Commission, Congress, the Department of Transportation, the Justice Department, and the Federal Trade
Commission.18 These latter three government agencies will then furnish
their own analysis of the impact of the 1984 Act to Congress and the
Advisory Commission. 9 Each of the agency reports must specifically
address: 1) the advisability of adopting a system of tariffs based on volume or mass of shipment; 2) the need for antitrust immunity for ports
and marine terminals; and 3) the continuing need for the statutory re91
quirement that tariffs be filed with and enforced by the F.M.C..1
On September 20, 1989, the F.M.C. published its Section 18 Report

187.
188.

46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(0.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(a).

189. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(c). During the five-year time period between enactment
of the 1984 Act and submission of the Section 18 Report to Congress, the F.M.C. was
also required to consult with the Department of Transportation, the Justice Department,
and the F.T.C. annually concerning data collection. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(b).
190. These reports are due within 60 days after the F.M.C. submits its report. 46
U.S.C. app. § 1717(c)(2).
191. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(c)(3).
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on the Shipping Act of 1984.92 The 697-page report contains explicit
conclusions concerning the issues that Congress required the F.M.C. to
study.193 It also contains a wealth of data providing a snapshot of the
international ocean liner industry as it has operated under the 1984 Act.
In general, the F.M.C. concluded that the Shipping Act of 1984 has
not had a substantial impact on rates or service levels in the United
States oceanborne trades.' 9 4 The events that have occurred in the trades
since 1984 can, in general, be attributed to general United States economic trends in international trade that predate enactment of the Shipping Act of 1984."" The 1984 Act has been successful in one of its primary goals-reducing the length and cost of processing conference
agreements at the F.M.C..' 9 6 This, in turn, has freed F.M.C. resources
to expand its enforcement efforts against industry malpractices and re97
strictive shipping policies of foreign governments.1
The F.M.C. concluded that the negative consequences feared by those
opposed to a strengthening of the conference system did not occur.' 9 '
While "superconferences" have formed, they have not raised rates, curtailed services, or reduced the level of independent competition. Indeed,
the F.M.C. could not discern any direct impact on rate levels, service
frequency, or strength of independent competition in the United States
trades as a direct result of the Shipping Act of 1984.'
In addition, the F.M.C. noted that the introduction of service contracts
into the United States regulatory scheme has had a substantial impact on
how freight moves in the United States trades.20 0 The F.M.C. stated that
it is unclear whether service contracts have caused a decrease in tariff
rates. 20 ' It also found independent action to have had an important impact on the trades.20 2 In general, the F.M.C. stated that these provisions
of the 1984 Act, when used, were marketing tools that reflected market
192, SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5.
193, See generally Executive Summary, SECrION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 7-13.
194, SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 8-9, 155-373.
195, Id. at 8-9, 155-56, 203-04, 263-65.
196, Id. at 7-8, 101-22, 375-83.
197. Id. at 7.
198. Id. at 7-9, 155-56.
199, Id. at 8-9, 192-95, 203-04, 263-65. The Advisory Commission did conclude that
rates have been less stable in some trades, that the number of independent carriers had
increased in three of five trades studied, and that significant capacity was added to the
trades. It could not, however, conclude that these changes were statistically significant or
related to the 1984 Act. Id. at 200, 243, 328.
200. Id. at 609-10.
201. Id. at 637.
202. Id. at 664, 676.
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conditions rather than created them. While it found rate instability in
many of the United States trades and increased capacity in others, the
F.M.C. concluded that these events were related to trade flows and that
the 1984 Act had a minimum impact on rate structure or stability.20 3
The Section 18 Report implies that the negative consequences of a
strengthened conference system that opponents of that system had feared
did not occur under the Shipping Act of 1984 for two simple reasons.
First, the international liner trades remain overtonnaged. The F.M.C.
found that capacity increased under the 1984 Act and that the role
played by independents, including the percentage of high-valued cargo
carried by them, also increased. This added competition to the United
States trades.20 4 Second, any rate instability in the trades could be attributed to this surplus capacity responding to international trends in supply
and demand and changes in currency exchange rates.20 5
The Section 18 Report concluded that the current tariff system that
allows the use of volume/mass and commodity rates should be retained.2 6 The F.M.C. also recommended retention of the current tariff
filing system. " It suggested that the question of antitrust immunity for
ports is a political question rather than an economic one.20 '
The Section 18 Report in general favored maintaining the status quo
of the Shipping Act of 1984, including retention of the open conference
system. The report's conclusions, however, raise several important questions for the Presidential Advisory Commission. If the conference system
allowed under the 1984 Act has not enhanced or detracted from rate
stability, would a closed conference system accomplish this goal? Alternatively, are there compelling reasons to maintain the conference system
if rate and service levels are responsive to general trade conditions rather
than carrier efforts at rationalization? Finally, are the new provisions in

203. Id. at 18-20, 653-55.
204. See, e.g., id. at 8-9, 19, 21, 156, 177.
205. Id. at 8-9, 19, 155-56, 203-05.
206. The F.M.C. noted that while there is little industry support for adopting an
exclusive volume/mass tariff system, a system based on per container lump sum rates is
gaining shipper support. The F.M.C. argued against changing the current tariff system
because the system, while simplifying tariff filing, could distort the existing transportation system by: 1) reducing the movement of low-valued cargo in United States trades; 2)
increasing the impact of independent action on conferences; 3) causing a distortion in the
choice of ports, including cargo diversion to Canada; and 4) complicating the establishment of intermodal rates. Id. at 10, 389, 395-432.
207. The F.M.C. in essence concluded that tariff filing is necessary to its enforcement functions'and to prevent discrimination in shipping. Id. at 11, 489-90, 559-606.
208. Id. at 10-11, 436-37, 469-81.
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the 1984 Act beneficial or detrimental to the conference system?209
In addressing these questions, the Presidential Advisory Commission
will focus on the interrelationship between service contracts, independent
action, intermodalism, and tariffs. The Section 18 Report noted that
under the 1984 Act, service contracts have significantly impacted some
segments of the international trades.210 For some commodities, in some
trades, the port-to-port tariff rate has become a "paper" rate. 1' Most
major commodities instead move under service contract rates.212 These
rates can be eleven to twenty-five percent lower than the applicable tariff
rate.213
Similarly, independent action, while not utilized on a generalized basis, may result in rate reductions of up to fifty percent.21 4 In addition,
independent action may be more frequently used in overtonnaged trades
with large "superconferences." 2' 5 The F.M.C. suggests that independent
action may have an important influence on service contract rates because
tariff rates often form the basis of service contract rates.21 6
The Section 18 Report noted that the majority of service contracts
provide for both port-to-port and through intermodal services. 211 In a
separate conclusion, the F.M.C. also noted that economic trends in
through intermodalism predating the 1984 Act have tended to concentrate liner services to the coastal regions closest to the foreign origin or

209. The Section 18 Report addressed some aspects of these questions by comparing
service and capacity level changes in the U.S./Far East trades as opposed to similar
service patterns experienced by the closed conferences in the Europe/Far East trades.
The report found that changes in service characteristics in the two trades are similar.
Nonetheless, while container capacity in both trades increased by 70 to 75%, the number
of voyages in the United States .trades increased, while those in the European trades
declined. The report suggested that the closed conference system may be able to expand
capacity in a more cost-efficient manner. Id. at 260-63.
210. Id. at 609.
211. Id. at 635-37.
212. The Section 18 Report stated that virtually all automobile, bus, and truck components, as well as automobile panel parts, moved under service contracts in 1988. More
than 60% of audio and over 40% of video electronic equipment from Japan to the United
States moved under service contracts. Id. at 637-38.
213. Id. at 633-35. For example, in October 1988 the Atlantic North Europe Conference (ANEC) tariff port-to-port rate for a 40 foot container of engines was $7,026.
The intermodal point-to-point service contract rate for a 40 foot container was $2,308.

Id. at 636,
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

676.
201, 658.
655.
619, 622.
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destination points.2 1 s While the Section 18 Report stated there is no
strong evidence that "load centers" have developed,2 19 these two conclusions support the inference that through intermodalism in a contract environment is now a significant factor in the United States international
transportation marketplace.
The Section 18 Report recognized that larger shippers may be able to
take greater advantage of these market innovations than smaller shippers.22 In examining the questions of simplified tariff rates, continued
tariff filing and enforcement, and port antitrust immunity in the context
of a strengthened conference system, the Presidential Advisory Commission should also examine the other ramifications of these issues. Should
international rate structures remain distinct from those used in the domestic marketplace, or should the deregulated contract system of carriage
in the domestic marketplace be adopted for the international trades?22
Should state sovereignty in the context of local economic development
allow port antitrust immunity to provide regional trading zones? Finally,
do changing world trading patterns and transportation systems still require a system of common carriage to protect the small and mediumsized shipper?2 22
2. Tariff Filing and FAK Rates
During the 1984 debates, opponents of the conference system opposed
tariff filing on the grounds that it merely serves to reinforce the conference system. The Reagan Administration argued that if it allowed antitrust exempt conferences, the Government should not assist them in
monitoring their members' activities through a system of tariff filing. 2 3
Tariff filing has been an important function of the F.M.C. in the international trades since 1961.224 The use of filed tariffs is viewed as inherent to a system of common carriage. To ensure there is no discrimination
against shippers, the oversight agency must review tariffs and police
rates.228
218. Id. at 264.
219. Id.
220. Cf. id. at 578-81.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 244-58.
222. See infra part III, section B(2)(b).
223. HouseJudiciaryHearings, supra note 39, at 7-8 (testimony of James C. Miller
III); Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 39, at 510 (testimony of Drew Lewis,
Secretary of Transportation); Senate JudiciaryHearings, supra note 40, at 11-12, 19-22
(testimony of Thomas Campbell, Federal Trade Commission).
224. See supra note 36.
225. Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 39, at 375-83 (supplemental testi-
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Opponents of tariff filing argued, however, that all the system really
does in a conference environment is strengthen the conference. If every
carrier and conference knows what other carriers or conferences are
charging, rate competition will never occur. Carriers should join the conference because, if they remain independent, the conference will merely
monitor their rates and meet or beat them. If tariffs do not exist, however, then rate uncertainty will exist, and thus some competition will
enter into the system.22
Tariff filing has been an important part of the United States system of
regulated common carriage. The policy behind it is one of nondiscrimination by providing information and uniformity of rates and services to
shippers.22 7 Many other countries, however, do not use a tariff filing
system in order to ensure adherence to common carriage principles.22 s
Since deregulation in the early 1980s, it has also not been a significant
229
part of the domestic United States intermodal transportation system.
Current law does not require common carriers in the international
trades to file tariffs or enter into service contracts providing for FAK or
per container rates. Instead, each carrier or conference makes its own
decision as to its rate structure. While concepts of common carriage do
mony of Council of American Flag Ship operators). See SECTION 18

REPORT, supra
note 5, at 491-500.
226. See supra note 223; SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 500-08.
227. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 10,761(a), 10,762; Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915). Similar provisions are found in the 1984 Act. See 46 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1707(a), 1709(b); Costa Line Cargo Services v. McGraw-Edison Co., 623 F.
Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
228. See, e.g., Letter from G.J.M. Verhaar, Secretary General, European Shipper's
Councils to R.V. Collins, President, Draco Marines Ltd. (Apr. 28, 1989), reprinted in

SECTION 18 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 195. Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra

note 39, at 510 (testimony of Drew Lewis, Secretary of Transportation). SECTION 18
REPORT, supra note 5, at 535-41.
229. Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, surface motor carrier services are subject to several different legal classifications. Motor
common carrier service is provided pursuant to a tariff filed with the I.C.C. 49 U.S.C. §§
10,761, 10,762 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Motor contract carriage is provided pursuant to
a written bilateral contract between the motor carrier and shipper. 49 U.S.C. § 10,527.
Motor carrier services provided within a commercial zone are exempt from I.C.C. economic regulation. 49 U.S.C. § 10,526(b).
Under the Staggers Rail Deregulation Act of 1980, intermodal rail carrier services
have been exempted from I.C.C. regulation. Intermodal Agreement, supra note 179. In
general, rail carrier intermodal service is provided pursuant to written contracts negotiated between the rail carrier and shipper. See generally Co-Operative Shippers v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 613 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd, 840 F.2d 447
(7th Cir. 1988).
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not allow discrimination between shippers, the current tariff system,
which provides that rates must be published on a commodity, weight, or
measure basis, may allow discrimination based on such transportation
characteristics as bulk, weight, density, and value.2"' Such discriminatory
treatment is often justified on the grounds that different transportation
characteristics justify different rates.2 3 '
The question of FAK or per container rates, tariff filing, and service
contracts are intertwined with continuance of the conference system and
a common carriage system of transportation. These questions address the
key issues of discrimination and efficiency.
Adoption of a tariff system based on volume or mass of shipment may
be justified if technology and insurance factors have changed traditional
transportation pricing mechanisms. For example, if a container has a
given capacity and volume, and an ocean carrier can carry only a limited
number of containers, then the cost to the carrier in handling the shipment could arguably be predicated on the cost of moving the container,
not the value of the service to the shipper. Simply stated, if all goods
move in forty-foot containers, and the cost of moving each container is
the same, it should not make a difference to the carrier if one container
contains scrap paper and another contains Cartier watches or a mixture
of freight, as long as the carrier's dollar liability for loss and damage to
2 32
the two shipments is the same.
On the other hand, if the demand for liner services is a derived demand, then the liner operator may seek to justify its pricing on a value of
service basis on the theory that, while average costs to the carrier may be
predictable, higher value commodities must subsidize lower value com-

230.

46 C.F.R. § 580.6 (1989). As a practical matter, the per container or FAK rate

may already be here to stay. An FAK rate is usually expressed in terms of a specific
amount of cargo per weight of mixed cargo. Usually, the carrier will require that the

container not contain more that a certain percentage of cargo. Containerload rates are in
general rates per 100 pounds of a commodity, calculated to fill a container. Schmeltzer &

Peavy, supra note 22, at 219. The F.M.C.'s Section 18 Report found that most industry
participants preferred the current tariff rating system as providing maximum flexibility.

SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 531-34.
231. Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 119-20. See generally SECTION 18
REPORT, supra note 5, at 403-27.
232. See Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 22, at 218-21, 222-25; Agman, supra note
22, at 13-17; SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 396-97. Under the Carriage of

Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1300-1315 (Supp. V 1987)), the ocean carrier's liability on the ocean movement seg-

ment is limited to $500 per package or customary freight unit for loss or damage to any
shipment, absent shipper declaration of a higher value on the bill of lading. Thus, most

shippers insure their freight moving internationally. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5).
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modities in order to maintain the latter's presence in the market, and
thus the basis for the average rate. In this latter situation, an average
rate established without regard to the value of the service may force low
value commodities out of the international market. This, in turn, could
33
cause service disruptions or further overcapacity in the trades.
As a practical matter, the containerload rate already has significant
international acceptance due to the advent of service contracts and
through intermodal transportation. Many international and domestic
transportation contracts are drafted in terms of per container rates, although such rates in general reference the contents of the container, either on a commodity or FAK basis. However, controversy over a statutory requirement for the use of FAK rates may arise if the major
shippers' proposal to eliminate the antitrust exemption for conferences is
adopted and the exemption is replaced by a contract and tariff system
with larger shippers using contracts and smaller shippers using tariff
rates. The question is whether a cost-efficient method will exist for small
and medium-sized shippers to utilize mass or volume rates. At the heart
of this question is whether common carriage should be retained in the
international trades.23 4
a.

Service contracts and the tariff filing issue

Any analysis of the tariff filing issue will require the Advisory Commission to examine carefully the new role of service contracts in the international market. Congress did not anticipate in 1984 that service contracts would assume the important and controversial role they now play
in the international shipping industry.2 3 5 But Congress did recognize
233. SECTION 18 REPORT, sipra note 5, at 397-400; 401-03; 410-15.
234. Supplemental Shipper Position Paper, reprinted in SECTION 18 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 14, at 151-52. See also Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 22, at 218-21. The
use of per container rates is controversial in the domestic economy as well. Some ocean
and motor carriers allege that the use of per container rates creates an incentive for the
shipper to overload the container in violation of federal and state highway weight limitations. In two separate petitions, the American Trucking Association and steamship conferences have asked the F.M.C. to establish maximum container weight limits or to eliminate the use of per container rates for certain high density commodities. Ocean carriers
contend that they have been unable to eliminate unilaterally the use of per container
rates. See Maximum Container Weights; Filing of Petition for Rulemaking, 54 Fed.
Reg. 35,246 (F.M.C. 1989) (Petition No. P3-89); Elimination of "Per Container" Rates;
Filing of Petition for Rulemaking, 54 Fed. Reg. 35,246 (F.M.C. 1989) (Petition No P4-

89).
235. Indeed, Congress thought that it would be primarily the large shipper that
would use a service contract. H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 53, at 17. See also S. REP.
No. 3, supra note 26, at 16, 21 (1983) (allowing large and small shippers to negotiate
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that service contracts would introduce an inherent tension undercutting
two basic premises of the 1984 Act: a strong conference system and the
system of common carriage. 36 Congress recognized that the tensions between conferences and service contracts could undermine the conference
system.23 7 It therefore gave conferences the right to limit or prohibit the
use of service contracts."' Congress also authorized the Advisory Commission to examine whether independent action should be allowed on
service contracts.23 9 Congress was concerned that service contracts and
tariff rates could result in a two tier rate structure in ocean shipping, one
for large shippers, and one for small shippers.2 4
Introduction of service contracts in the international trades modeled
similar developments in the domestic markets, where shippers enter into
rail or motor carrier contracts to ensure intermodal transportation needs.
A major distinction exists, however, between the use of contracts in the
domestic and international markets. Domestically, contracts are confidential and, with few exceptions, are not filed with any federal agency.241
Internationally, contracts are filed confidentially at the F.M.C., but their
essential terms, including rates, are made available to other similarly situated shippers.242
The service contract provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984 have been
extensively utilized. The F.M.C.'s Section 18 Report indicated that for
some commodities, service contracts account for the vast proportion of
shipments, and, in some cases, the point-to-point service contract rate
will be lower than the tariff port-to-port rate for the same commodity.24 3

service contracts); H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 105, pt. 1, at 25-26.
236. See supra note 235.
237. Cf. CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 29-30.
238. Cf Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(a)(7) (The Shipping Act applies to agreements limiting service contracts.).

239.

CONF. REP.,

supra note 8, at 43.

240. Cf. Shipper Position Paper, supra note 14, at 23-24.
241. Intermodal rail and motor carrier contract transportation is exempt from rate
regulation by the I.C.C., and such contracts are thus confidential. See Intermodal Movement, supra note 179; 49 U.S.C. § 10,526. Regulated rail contracts are filed with the
I.C.C., but on a confidential basis. 49 U.S.C. § 10,713. See generally 49 U.S.C. §
10,762.
242. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(c).
243. For example, the F.M.C. stated that only 10% of the United States ANEC's
total tonnage of roadmaking equipment parts moved under port-to-port tariff rates in
1985. The remainder moved under conference service contracts. It noted that the
ANEC's 1985 port-to-port tariff rate was $3,317 for a 40-foot container. The intermodal
point-to-point service contract rate for the same commodity was $2,420. SECTION 18
REPORT, supra note 5, at 633-37. See also BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, FED.
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The impact of service contracts on the way shippers buy ocean liner
services has also been substantial. Some shippers have reportedly reduced
the size of, or have spun off, their transportation departments. Shippers
have entered into long-term contracts with one or more carriers or conferences for their ocean transportation needs, in some cases contracting
with a single carrier to provide virtually worldwide ocean transportation
2 44

services.

As anticipated by Congress, large shippers have embraced the use of
service contracts. These shippers argue that service contracts can be easily identified from the "confidential" contract summaries on file with the
F.M.C.. They thus argue that service contracts should be totally confidential. 24 5 Congress, however, specifically authorized the filing of essential terms with the intent that similarly situated shippers could obtain
the same terms. By doing so, Congress sought to preserve some elements
of common carriage that would protect smaller shippers.246
Carriers and shippers have used service contracts differently than anticipated by Congress. They have negotiated contracts that provide the
shipper a guaranteed market rate, rather than invoking the statutory obligation to offer similar essential terms to similarly situated shippers."'
Conferences do not like such service contract provisions because they de248
tract from conference cohesion and rate stability.

Tariff rates and confidential contracts represent the two sides of a key
issue facing the Advisory Commission. Shipper interests who argue for

18 STUDY, STATUS REPORT AS OF SEPT. 30, 1987, at 33
(1987). The F.M.C. stated that 17,103 service contracts were filed with the F.M.C. since
1984. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 619.
244. DuPont recently entered into a five year, multitrade loyalty contract with Orient Overseas Containerline (OOCL), under which it guarantees 25% of its tonnage over
a five year period in exchange for OOCL's guarantee of price and service in both the
Atlantic and Pacific trades. See Beargie & Canna, DuPontlOOCL Sign 5-Year Multitrade Loyalty Contract, AMERICAN SHIPPER 54 (Sept. 1989); DuPont Sees a Problem in
Service Contracts, AMERICAN SHIPPER 14 (Mar. 1989). See Are Traffic Departmentson
the Way Out?, AMERICAN SHIPPER 53 (July 1987); Kaiser A & C Spins Off Traffic
Unit, AMERICAN SHIPPER 50 (July 1987).
245. Shipper Position Paper, supra note 14, at 15-16.
246. See supra note 234.
247. These contract clauses are called most favored shipper or "Crazy Eddie"
clauses. See infra part III, section B(4)(b). The F.M.C.'s Bureau of Domestic Regulation has estimated that "Me-Too" contracts comprise about two percent of all contracts
filed with the F.M.C. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 621. Service Contracts,
Order Denying Petition of North Europe Conferences, F.M.C. No. 88-16, at 6 (Served
Sept. 5, 1989).
248. See Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 111-12.
MARITIME COMM'N, SECTION

1989]

UNITED STATES SHIPPING LAWS

confidential contracts and independent action are in essence arguing
against a conference and common carriage system, where the primary
regulatory goal is to avoid rate discrimination. Carriers and conferences
seeking to limit the right of shippers to enter into such contracts are in
essence arguing against the free market relationships present in most
2 49

other markets.

b.

Consolidators and tariff rates

In weighing these positions, the Advisory Commission must also examine the protections that Congress gave the small and medium-sized
shipper to compete with major shippers in the international trades.
There are currently two market mechanisms whereby the international
small and medium-sized shipper can obtain a volume rate discount similar to that of a large shipper: the nonvessel operating common carrier
(NVOCC) and the shippers' association. The NVOCC is strictly an
ocean industry creation. The shippers' association, a new entity in the
international trades since 1984, has a long history in the domestic
market.2 50
Theoretically, both NVOCCs and shippers' associations should allow
small shippers to obtain freight rates similar to those obtained by larger
shippers. However, whether NVOCCs and shippers' associations can
protect small and medium-sized shippers from discrimination in a contract carriage system depends on the role they would play in marketing a
carrier's services in the emerging transportation markets. To date, that
role has been unclear. The F.M.C.'s Section 18 Report indicated that
shippers' associations and NVOCCs combined accounted for only six
percent of the service contracts filed with the F.M.C. in the five year
period since 1984.251

Reliance on NVOCCs and shippers' associations as an alternative to a
tariff system of common carriage may be misplaced, given a fundamental
difference between the current domestic and international transportation
markets. In general, ocean carriers prefer to act as direct retailers of
249.

Compare Shipper Position Paper, supra note 14, at 15-16 with Carrier Position

Paper, supra note 19, at 111-12.
250. An NVOCC is a "common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which
the ocean transportation is provided and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean
common carrier." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(17). See also infra part II, section B(3)(c).

251.

The F.M.C. indicates that 33 shippers' associations negotiated 175 service con-

tracts between 1984 and 1988, and that 136 NVOCCs executed 884 service contracts
during the same time period. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 136, 161. Both
shippers' associations and NVOCCs have complained that ocean common carriers have
discriminated against them in service contract negotiations. Id. at 141, 142.
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their services. 52 Many domestic transportation companies, especially
railroads, currently act as wholesalers of intermodal services, extensively
relying on third parties to market and sell their services.2 53 In the domestic marketplace, the small and medium sized shipper has a wealth of
choices. In general, there is more than enough price competition, because
the small shipper can deal with truckers, shippers' agents, shippers' associations, brokers, or freight forwarders to obtain competitive transportation services.
These options are arguably less available in the international market.
Only one mode of transportation-ocean shipping-is available to ship
overseas. (Air cargo is in general too expensive.) Thus, the shipper cannot deal with competing modes but must use the ocean carrier. In addition, the intermediaries that consolidate less-than-containerload (LCL)
cargo to provide volume rate discounts to the shipper are in direct competition with the ocean carrier. Rather than acting as friendly retailers,
international intermediaries are perceived as contributing little to the
carriers' bottom line. Both shippers' associations and NVOCCs have
complained of ocean common carrier and conference discrimination in
negotiating service contracts.254 Finally, because intermediaries in the international and domestic markets have until recently operated in their
own spheres, many intermediaries may not have the expertise to establish their own international intermodal network to provide rates and services competitive with those of the ocean carriers.
The common carriage system contained in the 1984 Act is structured
to consider the impact of freight rates on the overall global competitiveness of United States goods. Once transportation is no longer a fixed
cost, but instead is treated as part of the corporate bottom line, it becomes important that it be provided quickly, efficiently, and at low cost,
because transportation costs can be a barrier to market entry.25 5
Thus, in determining what type of rate structure is necessary for the
international ocean transportation system, the Advisory Commission will
have to determine whether equivalent freight rates should be available
for large and small shippers for either the through transportation move-

252.
253.

Schmeltzer & Pcavy, supra note 22, at 218-21.
Id. See also Hoffman, Make-It-or-Break-It Time Nears for Third Parties,
TRAFFIC WORLD, June 12, 1989, at 6; LaMourie, Intermodal Third Party Relationships Taking Shape, AMERICAN SHIPPER 50 (May 1989).
254. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 136, 142. There may be some merit to
these complaints. See California Shipping Line v. Yangming Marine Transp., F.M.C.
No. 88-15 (NVOCC awarded reparations of $260,731, and $15,000 fine imposed on
carrier due to carrier discrimination).
255. Cf Shipper Position Paper, supra note 14, at 9-11.
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ment or only the ocean portion. Absent the existence of a truly independent and competitive international intermodal intermediary industry, or
the introduction of stronger protections from carrier discrimination
against intermediaries, small and medium-sized shippers may find that a
tariff system provides them with the best source of rate information in
the international trades, and the best protection against discrimination.
c. Can an international tariff system co-exist with a deregulated domestic transportation market?
One final question that the Advisory Commission must examine in
evaluating the tariff question is whether the existing tariff structure is
compatible with domestic deregulation. The prevalence of pocket rates
provides an example of the problems inherent in through transportation
involving a regulated international and a deregulated domestic transportation market. In this situation, ocean carriers allegedly negotiated
through intermodal rates with shippers but did not file those rates until
the shipment was tendered on board the ship, even if the shipper had
actually consigned the shipment to the carrier's agent several weeks earlier. The practice was possible because the international carrier's domestic rates, due to deregulation, did not have to be filed until the ocean
segment of the movement commenced. In essence, the ocean carrier
manipulated domestic transportation market prices in creating a rate for
its through movement. The effect of such a practice was allegedly discriminatory-shippers of the same commodities paid different rates. The
F.M.C. promulgated regulations prohibiting the practice by requiring
the applicable tariff rate to be the one in effect on the date the carrier
constructively received the shipment.25 6
Rate discrimination is now an accepted practice in the deregulated domestic contract market. Congress had sent mixed messages on the acceptability of such discrimination in the international transportation market.2 57 There are clear policy arguments against United States
companies' competing against one another on the basis of underlying
transportation costs in a world market. The concept of common carriage
is thus intrinsic to the Shipping Act of 1984.258 Yet, the 1984 Act's ser-

256. See Rule on Effective Date of Tariff Changes, 54 Fed. Reg. 20,127 (1989) (to
be codified at 46 C.F.R. 580.5(d)(3)), reprinted in 25 Shipping Reg. (P&F) 37 (F.M.C.
No. 88-19) (1989). Implementation of the regulation has been stayed pending disposition
of a petition for reconsideration. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,0346 (1989).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
258. H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 105, at 17; H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 137,
pt. 1, at 25-26.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22.1035

vice contract provisions introduced an element of rate discrimination in
the international trades, and service contracts are popular. Coordinating
the through intermodal international and domestic markets thus requires
a basic reconciliation between the policies of the deregulated domestic
market and the regulated international market.
3. Ports and the New Marketplace
The Advisory Commission must also address the role of ports in the
new marketplace.25 Prior to 1984, ports enjoyed a protected status from
some forms of carrier discrimination because of geographic location. A
port could expect that, under F.M.C. interpretations of the Shipping Act
of 1916 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, cargo would move
through the port to which it was geographically and economically the
closest, that is, "naturally tributary."26 Antitrust immunity was given to
ports to ensure geographic rationalization, especially since they dealt
with carriers that also had such protection.2 61
Technological changes, however, introduced the concept of regional
load centers, each competitive by geographic region, leading to a specific
port to act as the chief gateway to interior sections of the United States,
with other ports continuing to operate by servicing niche markets. The
concept of the "naturally tributary" port has thus fallen into
disrepute.26 2
This development underlies the question of continued antitrust immunity for ports. If ports compete with one another for load center status,
then an antitrust exemption may be counterproductive. The Advisory
Commission has a mandate to study this issue.26
259. The agency "reports shall specifically address ... the need for antitrust immunity for ports and marine terminals." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(c)(3)(B).
260. See Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 815, 816 (1982) (amended 1984);
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988, 992 (1920). Containerization of
port facilities led to carrier absorption of overland transportation rates in order to secure
faster turnaround time at the facilities. The F.M.C. generally upheld such cargo diversion when it was found to be cost justified. See Investigation of Overland and OCP Rates
and Absorptions, 12 F.M.C. 184 (1969); see also Boston Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 706 F.2d 1231, 1237-40 (1st Cir. 1983).
261. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 23
Shipping Reg. (P&F) 21 (1985) (F.M.C. Nos. 84-6, 84-8). Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 39, at 130-36 (testimony of American Association of Port Authorities).
Position Paper of the American Association of Port Authorities, reprintedin SECTIoN 18
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 80-81 [hereinafter A.A.P.A. position paper].
262. See generally Bowman, Creative Marketing Strategies Aid Budget-Conscious
Ports, TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 12, 1988, at 10.
263. In its Section 18 Report, the F.M.C. concluded that the historical antecedents
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The question of port innovation and the future role of ports in United
States world trade bears heavily not only on the future of an antitrust
immunity for marine terminal operators, but also upon such questions as
tariff filing and coordination between the domestic and international intermodal markets. Since 1984 the United States port industry has been
highly innovative, seeking many different ways to preserve and increase
the regional market share of ports. Ports have sponsored, developed, or
engaged in such joint ventures as inland terminals,2 64 export trading
companies,26 5 shippers' agents, and shippers' associationg266 in an attempt to attract the traffic of the small and medium-sized importer and
exporter. Such innovations may introduce a new intermediary in the
marketplace that can assist small and medium-sized shippers to obtain
the benefits of volume international intermodal transportation services.
The port antitrust immunity may be justified if ports utilize their antitrust immunity to compete or work with other transportation providers.
The Advisory Commission must also examine several other laws and
legal doctrines affecting port authority antitrust immunity. For example,
port authorities may claim the benefit of the state action doctrine in order to protect their activities from antitrust scrutiny. 6 Port authorities

justifying the initial granting of an antitrust exemption to port authorities no longer
exist. It also concluded that an antitrust exemption for publicly owned ports is unnecessary, while such an exemption for privately owned ports cannot be justified by economic
theory. The F.M.C. in essence stated that continuance of the port antitrust exemption is
thus a political question. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 435-81.
264. For example, the Port Authority of Virginia has developed an "inland port" in
Front Royal, Virginia, as a means to divert cargo from the Ports of Baltimore and New
York/New Jersey to the Virginia Ports of Hampton Roads. The inland port, located 235
miles from the port in Norfolk, a chief competitor of the Ports of Baltimore and New
York/New Jersey, is situated at the juncture of several major interstate highways and
rail carrier lines. See generally Hoffman, East Coast Port Competition for Midwest

Freight Heats Up, TRAFFIC

WORLD,

Sept. 12, 1988, at 6.

265. For example, the Port Authorities of New York/New Jersey and Virginia each
have their own export trading companies. Bowman, Creative Marketing Strategies Aid
Budget-Conscious Ports, TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 12, 1988, at 10, 11-12; Port Authorities Move More Than Cargo, 109 BUSINEss AMERICA 31 (1988).
266. For example, the Port Authority of Seattle operates a shippers' agent service
that arranges for motor carrier service on shipments to and from Seattle. See Hoffman,
supra note 264, at 12. The Port of Portland, Oregon, has been a major force in developing and operating the Columbia River Shippers Association. See Dept. ofJustice Business Review Letter Re Columbia River Shippers Association, 24 Shipping Reg. (P&F)
929 (1988).
267. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (state market competition restricting); Interface Group, Inc., v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 12-13 (1st
Cir. 1987) ("[A]ntitrust laws do not reach restraints of trade imposed by state, rather
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may also claim exemption for their actions under the Local Government
Antitrust Immunities Act.26 Finally, port authorities may also obtain
the protection of Department of Commerce Export Trade Certificates of
Review, 2 9 or Justice Department business review letters.2 70 Each of
these statutory tools provides innovative exemptions from the antitrust
laws. Yet, they do not necessarily provide the explicit exemption for cooperative agreements that the Shipping Act of 1984 provides.
4. Other Issues: Rate Instability, Trade Malpractices, and Conference
Cohesion. Has the New Marketplace Undermined the Concept of Common Carriage?
Given the strong shipper opposition to a continuation of the conference system, it is not likely that the Advisory Commission will recommend adoption of a closed conference system. However, it is possible that
the Advisory Commission will recommend continued legal recognition of
the conference system and merely provide for a fine tuning of the Shipping Act of 1984. The Advisory Commission may make such a recommendation because, in many respects, its review of ocean conferences is
ill-timed. It comes prior to the expiration of the Uruguay Round on the
GATT, which, for the first time, will address trade in services.271 The
Advisory Commission's report will be issued two years before completion
of the borderless European Common Market. 2 It arrives a decade
before the next century at a point where the structural aspects of United
States trade, the trade and budget deficits, cannot clearly be described as
either permanent fixtures on the economic landscape or merely transitory
political problems that will be resolved in the near future.

than private parties" (emphasis in original)); Capital Freight Serv. v. Trailer Marine
Transp., 704 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

268.
269.
270.
271.

15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988).
15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021.
28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1989).
Ministerial Declaration of Punta Del Este, of September 20, 1986, reprinted in

LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT III.A.2 (K. Simmonds & B. Hill eds. 1989).
See Reinstein, Services in the Uruguay Round: The U.S. Viewpoint, in CONFLICT AND
RESOLUTION IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS AT THE OPENING OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 207 (S.Rubin & M. Jones eds. 1989).

272. The Advisory Commission's report is due at the end of 1990. 46 U.S.C. app. §
1717(h). The deadline for the borderless European Common Market is January 1, 1993.
The European Council set the guideline on March 29 and 30, 1985, in Brussels. See

generally COMMISSION

OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTER-

NAL MARKET: WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

(1989); Single European Act, arts. 18, 19, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 8 (1987).
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In addition, political comity, which has served the conference system
well for over a century, is a strong and valid consideration for the continuation of the conference system. If the trading partners of the United
States continue to support the conference system, then it may be neces2 73
sary to keep it.
Congress may have anticipated that the Advisory Commission would
273. United States trading partners such as the major Western European nations are
likely to maintain their support for the conference system. See, e.g., Diplomatic Note of
April 12, 1989 from the Consultative Shipping Group, reprinted in SECTION 18 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 179. Some restrictions on the system have been imposed,
however, and some conference activities approved by the F.M.C. are under scrutiny by
the European Economic Community (EC). See supra notes 146, 175 and 186.
In recent years, however, the EC has been more aggressive in applying its general
competition laws to the conference system and maritime transportation companies. For
example, in 1986 the EC adopted four regulations that clarified the right to offer shipping services in the EC. Three of these regulations addressed the right to offer shipping
services in the European trades. Council Regulation (EEC)No. 4055186, Applying the
Principle of Freedom to Provide Services to Maritime Transport Between Member
States and Between Member States and Third Countries, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. 14 (No.
L 378) (1986); Council Regulation (EEC)No. 4057186, On Unfair PricingPractices
in Maritime Transport, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. 14 (No. L 378) (1986); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4058186 Concerning CoordinatedAction To Safeguard Free Access to
Cargoes in Ocean Trades, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. 21 (No. L 378) (1986). The fourth
regulation, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056186, Laying Down Detailed Maritime
Transport, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. 4 (No. L 378) (1986), applied the competition rules of
the Treaty of Rome to the ocean liner industry but provided a block exemption for liner
conference activities. See Bayer, Antitrust Comes to Maritime Transport in the European Economic Community, 34 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 299 (1987); FMC Hearings,
April 6, 1989, at 37-47 (Comments of Heinz Hilbrecht, First Secretary, Transportation,
Energy, and Environmental Policy, Delegation of the European Community).
Whle the EC antitrust exemption for the liner conference system is similar to that of
the United States, the possibility of conflict may increase. The Eurocorde Agreement is
an example of such a conflict. Originally approved by the F.M.C. as a discussion agreement between North Atlantic Conference Carriers and independent ocean common carriers, the Eurocorde Agreement has been challenged several times by European shippers
who contend that the activities of Eurocorde are outside the scope of the EC's exemption
for liner conference activities and have an adverse effect on through intermodal transporation services. In December 1988 the EC adopted regulations that implemented the
provisions of Council Regulation No. 4056/86. Regulation No. 4260188, On The Communications, Complaints and Applications and the Hearings Providedfor in Council
Regulations No. 4056186, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 376) (1988). See Unsworth,
British Shippers Allege North Atlantic Price-Fixing,J. CoM., Sept. 30, 1987, at IA;
Barnard, EC Watchdogs Sudenly Notice Shipping, J. CoM., Oct. 13, 1987, at 1A;
Sonter, European Shippers Renew Calls for Investigation of Eurocorde, TRAFFIC
WORLD, Aug. 7, 1989, at 43; Canna, EC Opposes Blanket OK to Eurocorde, AMERICAN
SHIPPER, Dec. 1989, at 9; Canna, EC and FMC Compare Notes, AMERICAN SHIPPER,
Jan. 1990, at 14.
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recommend retention of the conference system. Congressional desire to
retain the conference system may be discerned from the discrete provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984 that Congress specifically authorized
both the F.M.C. and the Advisory Commission to reexamine. Several of
these provisions have already been discussed. Congress stated that it expected the Advisory Committee to examine tariff filing and the right of
independent action on service contracts.2 74 There are other issues even
more intimately related to the operation of an open conference system
and the current operation of the Shipping Act of 1984. These issues include the general right to independent action,2 71 the right to use market
rate clauses in service contracts,2 8 and the definition of "shipper" under
the 1984 Act. 2 77 Resolution of these issues may have a substantial impact
on the success of the current conference system and the Shipping Act of
1984. The Advisory Commission can be expected to address each of
them.
Carriers argue that these provisions represent new aspects of the 1984
Act that were designed to ensure that conferences do not become too
strong but have instead unduly weakened the conference system.2 7' They
argue that these three provisions of the 1984 Act are the prime cause of
the rate instability that has existed in the international trades. 7 9 Thus,
carriers argue that these provisions of the 1984 Act must be weakened or
eliminated. Shippers have argued exactly the opposite: that if the open
conference system is preserved, these "shipper protections" must be
strengthened, not weakened. In examining these provisions, the Advisor),
Commission must focus on whether they have contributed to rate instability or industry malpractices. Since 1984 the F.M.C. has had to initiate
two major investigations of industry rebating malpractices, one in the
North Atlantic trades, and the other in the TransPacific trades. These
three provisions may in some way have fostered the environment allowing these malpractices. *s°
a.

Independent action

Carriers object to independent action because it appears to have
worked exactly as intended: if a member of a conference wants to offer a

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See supra part III, section B(2); infra part III, section (B)(4)(a).
See supra part II, section B(4)(a), infra part III, section (B)(4)(a).
See infra part III, section B(4)(b).
See infra part III, section B(4)(c).
Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 109-18.
Cf Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 109-10.
Shipper Position Paper, supra note 14, at 7-14.
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rate or service different from that offered by the conference, it simply
takes independent action.2 8 Independent action can mean an increase in
rates, but since 1984 carriers contend that it has in general forced conferences to decrease rates.2 82
Independent action cannot be discussed without consideration of the
question of service contracts. Although conferences have the right to prohibit independent action on service contracts, the issue is one for specific
review by the Advisory Commission. Whether independent action applies to conference rules on loyalty contracts is also controversial.2"' Rate
negotiator shippers' associations have also complained that some carriers
will negotiate with the association and then "steal" its largest member.
In a conference setting this may occur because the conference will negotiate service contract conditions with a shipper, and then a conference
member, privy to the conference negotiations, will exercise independent
action to secure its own separate contract with the shipper at a lower
28 4
rate.
A strong conference system would appear to require an ability of the
conference to discipline its members and assure adherence to the conference rate. Independent action may undermine this goal. Conference
members must choose to exercise independent action, however, in order
to make the statutory provision effective. Shippers argue that conferences
have imposed barriers and have otherwise misused independent action.28 5
Conferences, on the other hand, complain that independent action is too
frequently and easily exercised. They would impose additional barriers
to its use. 28 ' As with the use of such contract terms as the "Crazy Eddie"
clause, discussed below, the exercise of independent action by conference
members may indicate that carriers may not necessarily want to adhere

281. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1704(b)(8); Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 109-10.
282. Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 109. The F.M.C. concluded that independent action has a tendency to be used in trades that are overtoninaged with a large
number of independent carriers and subject to rate instability as a result of changing
trade conditions. Market conditions, not independent action, determine ultimate rate
levels. SECTION 18 REPORT, supra note 5, at 653-55.
283. See supra note 109.
284. Shippers' Association Position Paper, supra note 154, at 40.
285. Shipper Position Paper, supra note 14, at 17-18. Shippers argue, for example,
that conference members may discuss proposed independent action before the 10 day
notice period commences, and that conference members will collectively discuss independent actions after the fact.
286. Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 109-10. Carriers argue that a 60 day
notice period for independent action should be permitted and that in the event of shorter
notice periods, the conferences should be able to require an independent action proposal
to be tabled at least one meeting before notice of the action is given.
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to the conference line.
b.

Market rate service contracts and the question of Crazy Eddie

The continued dominance of New York City in maritime circles
manifests itself in the term "Crazy Eddie," ascribed to certain market
rate provisions written into some service contracts. As the use of service
contracts significantly increased in 1985 and 1986, carriers and shippers
began writing market rate clauses into their service contracts. One of
these clauses was known as a "most favored shipper" clause.28 The
other was known as a "Crazy Eddie" clause, after a New York electronics retailer who promised that he would not be undersold.28 8
Most favored shipper clauses guarantee that the shipper will obtain
the lowest market rate on any shipped commodity offered by the carrier
in either its tariffs or service contracts.2 89 Crazy Eddie clauses promise
the shipper that the carrier will meet any rate offered by any other carrier to any other shipper in that market.2 90
In the first two years after enactment of the Shipping Act of 1984, the
number of service contracts proliferated at the same time that rates were
decreasing. Carriers were alarmed by this decline. In 1986 the International Council of Containership Operators petitioned the F.M.C. to prohibit the use of these market rate contracts. It also asked the F.M.C. to
prohibit the use of de minimus liquidated damages clauses in service
contracts.2" 1 The carriers' argument was that the use of market rate contracts combined with minimum damages provisions for a breach of contract creates rate instability because shippers will be tempted to obtain
market rate clauses, or will breach their contracts, in order to obtain the
lowest possible rate."' The carriers argued to the F.M.C. that this was
2 93
not the intent of Congress in authorizing the use of service contracts.
The F.M.C. initially agreed to prohibit the use of Crazy Eddie
clauses, but not most favored shipper clauses.294 It subsequently stated
that it would not prohibit the use of either form of market rate clause.2 95

287. Service Contracts-"Most Favored Shipper" Provisions, 24 Shipping Reg.
(P&F) 1351, 1352-53 & n.2 (1988) (F.M.C. No. 88-7) [hereinafter Crazy Eddie Rule].
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1355.
292. Id.; F.M.C., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 87675, 8776-77
(1988).
293. Crazy Eddie Rule, supra note 287, at 1355.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1353.
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It also held that it lacked jurisdiction to dictate acceptable liquidated
damages clauses.296
The Crazy Eddie question illustrates several fundamental questions
facing the Advisory Commission. One question is whether the use of
market rate clauses in service contracts generates rate and conference instability. Another question is whether a contract system is compatible
with a common carriage system of transportation. The use of market rate
contracts is a common practice in the deregulated domestic transportation
market.29 In the domestic marketplace, however, such contracts are confidential, and, with few exceptions, there are no mechanisms analogous
to the similarly-situated shipper provisions of the 1984 Act. The use of
such contracts, combined with independent action, may thus act at crosspurposes with a conference system whose aim is to facilitate rate stability." 8 Different regulatory philosophies will determine the ultimate fate
of Crazy Eddie. Either the existing system of market self regulation, allowing carriers to exercise their own self-help mechanisms, such as
prohibiting the use of service contracts, will be retained, or the F.M.C.
can be authorized to regulate the content of service contracts with possible prohibition of the use of most favored shipper clauses. Alternatively,
the essential terms provisions of the 1984 Act may be eliminated, creating a market environment similar to the deregulated domestic market.
c. Who is a shipper?
A final issue that the Advisory Commission must address is the question of who is a shipper under the Shipping Act of 1984. This has been
a subject of controversy since the first days of the 1984 Act.299 The issue
transcends mere technical interpretation of the 1984 Act's definitional
provisions. It addresses the future structure of the intermediary market
in the international trades and how ocean transportation services will be
296. Crazy Eddie Rule, supra note 287.
297. Id. at 1358.
298.

Cf CarrierPosition Paper, supra note 19, at 111-12.

299. The following proceedings have addressed the question of who is a shipper
under the Act: In re Petition for an Amended Statement of Policy Concerning the Status
of Shippers' Associations, reprinted in 22 Shipping Reg. (P&F) 1629 (1985) (denying
request to restrict membership in shippers' associations to owners of goods shipped by
the association); In re Petition of the U.S. Atlantic-North Europe Conference and the
North Europe-U.S. Atlantic Conference for a Rule Regarding the Term "Shipper", reprinted in 23 Shipping Reg. (P&F) 1381 (F.M.C. 1986) [hereinafter North European
Petition] (denial of request to restrict the term "shipper" to persons for whose account
transportation is provided); FACT FINDING 15, supra note 151. See also Definition of
Shipper and Availability of Mixed Commodity Rates, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,891 (1989) (pro-

posed rule; F.M.C. No. 89-20).
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provided to the small and medium-sized shipper. Over the past five
years, the domestic and international intermediary markets have been
merging, at the same time that fundamental changes have occurred in
the domestic intermediary market."' 0 These changes have a significant
bearing on how small and medium-sized shippers purchase international
ocean transportation services. The F.M.C. has been less than effective in
accommodating the changes in the current intermediary environment.
Under the Shipping Act of 1984, small and medium-sized shippers
who do not want to use the higher rates available from the direct retail
services of a steamship company may utilize the services of an NVOCC
or join a shippers' association. Unlike in the domestic market, these intermediaries are limited in the services they can offer in conjunction and
competition with ocean carriers.30 1
For example, a service contract under the 1984 Act is a contract between an ocean common carrier and a shipper or a shippers' association. 2 Nonvessel operating common carriers, which are defined as being
shippers, but are not ocean common carriers, are legally entitled to enter
into service contracts.30 3 However, they must resell the terms of these
service contracts to the public under tariff rates.3 0 They cannot offer or
enter into service contracts with other shippers, the only comparable
305
marketing tool being a time/volume rate offered pursuant to a tariff.
Shippers' associations do not face this legal obstacle. They do not hold
themselves out to the general public, and therefore need not file tariff
rates when they enter into service contracts on behalf of their members.
However, early in the history of the Shipping Act of 1984, the question
arose as to the scope of shippers' association membership.30 6 The F.M.C.
held that membership in a shippers' association by an intermediary that
resold its service contract or other transportation terms to the general
public did not alter the legal status of a shippers' association. The
F.M.C. based its conclusion on the grounds that such intermediaries are
defined as shippers under the 1984 Act.30 7

300.
301.
B(2)(b).
302.
303.

304.
305.

See supra part III, section B(2)(b)..
See, e.g., FACT FINDING 15, supra note 151. See also supra part III, section
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1702(21), 1707(c).
46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(17).
FACT FINDING

15, supra note 151, at 22-25.

NVOCCs Position Paper on the Shipping Act of 1984, reprinted in SECTION
18 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 97, 99 [hereinafter NVOCC Position Paper].
306. See AISA Petition, supra note 140, at 7,225-28.
307. Id. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, shippers' associations were treated as
exempt from regulation as freight forwarders because they were nonprofit and member-
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A strong argument can be made that the legal standards applicable to
intermediaries operating in the international transportation market
should be the same as for those operating in the domestic transportation
market if an integrated transportation system is to develop. The 1984
Act may be inadequate for this purpose. The problem is an inexact definition of the term "shipper" and a failure of Congress and the F.M.C. to
accommodate the international regulatory structure to the domestic marketplace. Under the Shipping Act of 1984, a "shipper" is defined as "an
owner or person for whose account the ocean transportation of cargo is
provided, or the person to whom delivery is to be made." 308 The first
and third definitions are fairly clear. There must be either a beneficial
interest in the shipped cargo or a future acceptance of responsibility for
the cargo. This comports with common legal principles concerning liability for the payment of freight charges."0 9
However, "the person for whose account the ocean transportation of
cargo is provided" has an inexact meaning, although its source, from
case law interpreting the previous shipping acts, is clear. 310 Simply
stated, it is unclear whether the language contemplates that nonbeneficial
interest shippers, for example, someone responsible for paying the freight

ship-based. Other intermediaries, including shippers' agents and property brokers, were
also exempt from freight forwarder regulation due to the nature of the services they
provided. 49 U.S.C. § 10,562(4) (1982) repealed by Surface Freight Deregulation Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-521, 100 Stat. 2993. Each, however, served the general public, and
the I.C.C. thus held that they could not belong to associations. See Sunshine State Shippers and Receivers Assoc.-Investigation of Operations, 350 I.C.C. 391 (1975). See also
Columbia Shippers and Receivers Assoc. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 310, 318-19 (D.
Del. 1969) (addressing situation in which members' activities create a bona fide shippers'
association); Freight Forwarders Inst. v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (rejecting requirement of joint and several liability of shipper assocation members).
In examining its statute, the F.M.C. concluded that NVOCCs, statutorily defined as
shippers, could be members of a shippers' association, notwithstanding the I.C.C. precedent and the fact that many domestic intermediaries were joining international associations. See AISA Petition, supra note 140.
308. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(23).
309. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336
(1982) (liability remains even if carrier violates agency credit regulations); States Marine
Int'l v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 524 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1975) (shipper primarily liable
for freight charges); O'Boyle Tank Lines, Inc. v. Beckham, 616 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1980)
(shipper presumed primarily liable in the usual case).
310. The 1916 Act did not define the term "shipper." The language contained in the
1984 Act, however, was used in discussing who was a shipper in the cases of Norman G.
Jensen, Inc. v. F.M.C., 497 F.2d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir. 1974), and Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique v. American Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1929). See also FACT
FINDING 15, supra note 151, at 36.
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charges, may exist, or whether the language merely clarifies those situations where an entity acts as an agent of a shipper.
This uncertainty affects the role of intermediaries in the international
trades. For example, under Interstate Commerce Commission decisions
interpreting the shippers' association provisions, analogous to those of
the 1984 Act, contained in the Interstate Commerce Act since 1942, nonbeneficial interest intermediaries, even if they were legally "shippers",
could not join shippers' associations on the grounds that to do so would
be to change the membership status of an association to that of one holding itself out to the general public."'
The F.M.C. has refused to adopt a similar restriction on international
shippers' associations. 12 It based its decision on the ambiguity of the
1984 Act's definition of the term "shipper". Since NVOCCs were defined as shippers under the 1984 Act, and NVOCCs were intermediaries
similar to those under the Interstate Commerce Commission decisions,
the F.M.C. determined that it could not adopt a restrictive policy. 3 3
This decision has created uncertainty in the intermediary market.3 4
Many carriers have complained that intermediaries not traditionally considered shippers have sought to sign service contracts. Ocean freight forwarders are supposedly the worst offenders. These intermediaries allegedly resell the terms of the service contract to their customers, without
filing a tariff with the F.M.C. and without acting as an NVOCC.3 1
The F.M.C. has also declined requests to amend the definition of
"shipper" on the grounds that the proposed definition would-have limited the universe of shippers to those being the owners and receivers of
shipped goods and NVOCCs3 1 Shippers' associations would have been
excluded from the definition, a result opposed by shippers' association
interests and the Justice Department. 17
The F.M.C. has been actively investigating the changing role of intermediaries in the international trades. Fact Finding Investigation No.
15 concluded that the definition was not causing major problems in the
international trades.31 8 It did, however, note that the F.M.C.'s earlier
refusal to declare who could belong to a shippers' association had been

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See supra note 307.
See AISA Petition, supra note 140, at 7,228.
Id. at 7,227-28.
Cf FACr FINDING 15, supra note 151, at 35-37.
Id. at 23-25, 31.
Northern European Petition, supra note 299, at 1381.
Id.
FAcT FINDING 15, supra note 151, at 40.
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"misinterpreted." '19 The F.M.C.'s report sent a clear signal that any
intermediary signing service contracts in the international trades and
reselling their terms to the general public was acting as an NVOCC and
should file'a tariff. The F.M.C. has also taken under advisement recommendations to initiate certain regulatory changes.32 0
In making its recommendations to Congress concerning regulation of
the international shipping industry, the Advisory Commission should
clarify the status of who is, and who is not, a shipper under the 1984 Act
and the role of intermediaries in marketing ocean services. The Comission should address, for example, whether ocean retail service should be
resold through intermediaries in a manner similar to that which has developed in the domestic marketplace.
Deregulation in the 1980s has forced major changes in the domestic
intermediary market. Shippers' agents purchase rail services wholesale
and retail them directly to the shipper. Motor carrier property brokers
do the same in the trucking industry. Shippers' associations operate in
both the rail and motor intermodal market. These entities are subject to
little or no regulation. They may act merely as an agent for the shipper
and do not assume common carrier liability. In many ways they are like
travel agents, acting either as agents or independent contractors depend-

319. Id. at 35.
320. Id. at 39-43. The F.M.C. has initiated investigations of malpractices in the
North Atlantic and TransPacific trades. These investigations have focused on rebating
activities that have in some circumstances involved unlicensed NVOCCs. Possible Malpractices in the TransAtlantic Trades, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,064 (F.M.C. 1987) (Fact Finding No. 16); Rebates and Other Malpractices in the Trans-Pacific Trades, 54 Fed. Reg.
18,595 (F.M.C. 1989) (Fact Finding No. 18).
In Definition of Shipper and Availability of Mixed Commodity Rates, 54 Fed. Reg.
40,891 (1989) (No. 89-20) [hereinafter Definition of Shipper] (to be codified at 46
C.F.R. pts. 58-81) (proposed Oct. 4, 1989), the F.M.C. attempted to address the untariffed NVOCC issue. As proposed, the rule would limit the definition of "shipper" to those
entities responsible for paying freight charges. The definition would thus not :nclude
agents of shippers. The proposed rule would also limit the availability of mixed commodity rates to those entities defined as shippers under the F.M.C.'s new regulations. Finally, the rule would require the identification of the legal status of such entities as
shippers on ocean carriers' shipping documents, including a listing of commodities
shipped and an NVOCC tariff number if the shipper is an NVOCC. The rule has thus
met with substantial opposition. See, e.g., Comments of the American Institute for Shippers' Assocations, Inc. (F.M.C. No. 89-20, Dec. 4, 1989); Comments of the Household
Goods Forwarders Association of America, Inc. (F.M.C. No. 89-20, Dec. 1, 1989); Comments of Worldwide Shippers Association, Inc. (F.M.C. No. 89-20, Nov. 14, 1989);
comments of American President Lines, Ltd. and American Consolidation Services, Ltd.
(F.M.C. No. 89-20, Nov. 17, 1989); Beargie, Middlemen, FMC Finds it Difficult to Sort
the Goodfrom the Bad, AMERICAN SHIPPER, Jan. 1990, at 22.
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ing on the transaction involved.3 21
The competitiveness of domestic intermediaries; not constrained by
tariff rates, resulted in the deregulation in 1986 of the domestic analogue
of the NVOCC, the surface freight forwarder. 2 2 While retaining common carrier status, surface freight forwarders are no longer bound by a
filed tariff rate. 2a They have injected additional competition into the domestic railroad and motor carrier markets.
The carrier industry has resisted intermediary competition in the international trades. Direct retailers of their services, carriers perceive little
value in the services of NVOCCs and shippers' associations.124 Carriers
have stated that the legal treatment of NVOCCs and shippers' associations should be as a different class of shipper from the treatment of beneficial interest shippers.32 The shipper definition question goes to the
heart of the structure of the emerging international intermodal transportation market. Who is a shipper, and whether an intermediary can service a market position as both shipper and transportation provider, are
crucial in determining whether the small and medium-sized shipper will
be protected in a tariff or contract regulatory system, and whether the
conference system should be retained.
As an alternative, the Advisory Commission may choose to clarify the
nature of the operations and services that each intermediary provides in
the international market. For example, it could recommend that
NVOCCs be licensed and bonded by the F.M.C., or that shippers' associations be certified. 2 6
IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article is not to reach or dictate conclusions for
the Presidential Advisory Commission and Congress. Those conclusions

FAcT FINDING 15, supra note 151, at 18-22.
322. See supra note 142.
323. Id.
324. See Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 22, at 218-21.
325. Carrier Position Paper, supra note 19, at 115-17.
326. NVOCCs have requested that provisions be adopted providing for industry licensing and bonding of NVOCCs. NVOCC Position Paper, supra note 305, at 98. Shippers' associations have opposed licensing, certification, and bonding for associations.
Shippers' Association Position Paper, supra note 154, at 39. In Definition of Shipper,
supra note 310, the F.M.C. proposed regulations that would limit the definition of
"shipper" and would require identification of shipper status, including NVOCC or shippers' association status, when a mixed commodity rate is used. In that proceeding, the
F.M.C. stated that it may adopt proposed regulations at a future date that would govern
the activities of shippers' associations, if such regulations are warranted.

321.
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should be made only after a complete public record has been developed.
However, by identifying the issues that have arisen over the five year
experience of the Shipping Act of 1984 and the broader context in which
the Advisory Commission should examine this experience, this Article
should provide a framework within which the Advisory Commission,
and Congress, can evaluate what United States regulatory policy for the
shipping industry should be for the next century.
This framework has one basic point. The transportation industry still
often thinks of itself as it developed in the early 20th century, segmented
by mode of transport and by domestic and international market. The
economic reports and studies requested by Congress for the Advisory
Commission will, of necessity, reflect this perception. It is doubtful, however, that this perception will accurately reflect the industry as it develops in the next century.
If the Advisory Commission on Conferences in Ocean Shipping is to
achieve a lasting mandate, one that will not require the formation of
another commission in the year 2000, then it must consider the changes
occurring in both the domestic and international markets and decide to
what extent United States shipping laws will accommodate and anticipate these changes. The Advisory Commission should squarely address
the role of common carriage in the international trades and the question
whether domestic transportation deregulation and the Shipping Act of
1984 can be further coordinated. The Advisory Commission should address whether regulation of ocean shipping and domestic transportation
can be combined in a single regulatory agency. Finally, the Advisory
Commission should remember that United States shipping policy is
merely a subset of United States diplomatic, national defense, and international trade policy. While this Article has focused on the commercial
and international trade issues that are the primary concerns of the carriers and shippers who deal with the Shipping Act on a day-to-day basis,
the Advisory Commission cannot forget the diplomatic and national defense aspects of United States maritime policy. A strong merchant
marine has been a historic aspect of United States maritime policy and,
to the degree that the conference system affects this, the Advisory Commission has a mandate to study it.
Similarly, comity with United States trading partners has always been
a significant aspect of the Shipping Acts. It will remain one. But diplomatic comity in recent years has often been synonymous with international trade issues. If, as recently suggested, the GATT is dead in the
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face of a tripolar trading world,827 then the Advisory Commission may
well conclude that political comity is also dead. Rather than continue the
conference system, the Advisory Commission may choose to recommend
bilateral shipping agreements between the major trading blocs, or inclusion of UNCTAD on a tripolar basis.
Finally, many of the issues facing the Advisory Commission present
policy questions with strong theoretical economic and political overtones.
It will be difficult for the Advisory Commission to ignore these aspects of
its mandate. In listening to the rhetoric surrounding the Shipping Act of
1984, however, the Advisory Commission should not lose sight of the fact
that the creation of the conference system over one hundred years ago
was the result of the combination of changing technology and the individual business decisions of ocean common carriers to act collectively.
Now, over one hundred years later, the Advisory Commission should
look at the emerging world trading patterns, and the behavior of the
shipping industry under the Shipping Act of 1984, and ask itself the very
practical question of whether the combination of changing technology
and the individual decisions of carriers will lead to the eventual demise
of the conference system.

327. GATT Trade Negotiations at "Dead End," Should Be Abandoned, U.S. Economist Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 180 (Feb. 8, 1989) (Comments of Lester
Thurow, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

